Coordination with Communication under Oath
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- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F. Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2018. "Coordination with communication under oath," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(3), pages 627-649, September.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & Jason Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2011. "Coordination with Communication under Oath," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00635801, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Jason Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2018. "Coordination with communication under oath," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01480525, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Jason Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2018. "Coordination with communication under oath," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01480525, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & Jason Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2011. "Coordination with Communication under Oath," Working Papers halshs-00635801, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Jason Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2018. "Coordination with communication under oath," Post-Print halshs-01480525, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Jason Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2015. "Coordination with Communication under Oath," Post-Print halshs-01232565, HAL.
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"Referenda Under Oath,"
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Alexander James & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F. Shogren, 2017.
"Referenda Under Oath,"
Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 67(3), pages 479-504, July.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Alexander James & Stephane Luchini & Jason Shogren, 2010. "Referenda under Oath," Working Papers halshs-00490448, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Alexander James & Stéphane Luchini & Jason Shogren, 2017. "Referenda Under Oath," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01301784, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Alexander James & Stéphane Luchini & Jason Shogren, 2017. "Referenda Under Oath," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01301784, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Alexander James & Stéphane Luchini & Jason Shogren, 2017. "Referenda Under Oath," Post-Print halshs-01301784, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Alexander James & Stephane Luchini & Jason Shogren, 2010. "Referenda under Oath," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00490448, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Julie Rosaz & Jason F. Shogren, 2019.
"Truth Telling Under Oath,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(1), pages 426-438, January.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Julie Rosaz & Jason Shogren, 2015. "Truth-telling under Oath," Post-Print halshs-01224135, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & Julie Rosaz & Jason Shogren, 2019. "Truth Telling Under Oath," Post-Print halshs-02018089, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & Julie Rosaz & Jason Shogren, 2019. "Truth Telling Under Oath," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02018089, HAL.
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More about this item
Keywords
Cheap talk communication; Oath; Coordination game;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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