Learning, words and actions : experimental evidence on coordination-improving information
This paper reports experimental results from a one-shot game with two Nash equilibria : the first one is efficient, the second one relies on weakly dominated strategies. The experimental treatments consider three information-enhancing mechanisms in the game : simple repetition, cheap-talk messages and observation of past actions from the current interaction partner. Our experimental results show the use of dominated strategies is quite widespread. Any kind of information (through learning, words or actions) increases efficiency. As regards coordination, we find that good history performs better than good messages ; but bad history performs worse than bad messages.
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- Bracht, Juergen & Feltovich, Nick, 2009. "Whatever you say, your reputation precedes you: Observation and cheap talk in the trust game," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(9-10), pages 1036-1044, October.
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- Nicolas Jacquemet & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2014. "What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01026080, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2011. "What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 11036, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
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- John Duffy & Nick Feltovich, 2006. "Words, Deeds, and Lies: Strategic Behaviour in Games with Multiple Signals," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(3), pages 669-688.
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