Strategic signaling or emotional sanctioning? An experimental study of ex post communication in a repeated public goods game
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- Zylbersztejn, Adam, 2014. "Strategic signaling or emotional sanctioning? An experimental study of ex post communication in a repeated public goods game," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 161, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
- Adam Zylbersztejn, 2014. "Strategic signaling or emotional sanctioning? An experimental study of ex post communication in a repeated public goods game," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp161, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
- Adam Zylbersztejn, 2013. "Strategic signaling or emotional sanctioning? An experimental study of ex post communication in a repeated public goods game," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 13011, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
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- Behnk, Sascha & Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván & García-Gallego, Aurora, 2019. "Deception and reputation – An experimental test of reporting systems," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 37-58.
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More about this item
Keywords
voluntary contribution mechanism; ex post communication; Public goods game; Biens publics; communication a posteriori;JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBE-2013-03-23 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2013-03-23 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2013-03-23 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2013-03-23 (Game Theory)
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