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Immaterial rewards and sanctions in a voluntary contribution experiment

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  • Peeters, R.J.A.P.

    (Microeconomics & Public Economics)

  • Vorsatz, M.

    (Microeconomics & Public Economics)

Abstract

In this paper, we compare the cause and effect of immaterial rewards and sanctions oncooperation in a voluntary contributions experiment. We find that both rewards andsanctions increase contributions only when subjects interact repeatedly, though rewardsseem to be more effective than sanctions. Moreover, in contrast to sanctions, rewards dohave an impact on future contributions. Although the direct effect is negative, there is apositive indirect effect that applies to subjects who contribute above (below) the groupaverage in a partner (stranger) matching. From this we conclude that sanctions andrewards are mainly used as a communication channel to coordinate on a more efficientoutcome. Nevertheless, subjects also seem to experience additional utility from receivingapproval, whereas they are insensitive to disapprovals.
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  • Peeters, R.J.A.P. & Vorsatz, M., 2009. "Immaterial rewards and sanctions in a voluntary contribution experiment," Research Memorandum 005, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    • Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2009005
    DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2009005
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    1. Rizzolli, Matteo & Tremewan, James, 2018. "Hard labor in the lab: Deterrence, non-monetary sanctions, and severe procedures," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 107-121.
    2. López-Pérez, Raúl & Vorsatz, Marc, 2010. "On approval and disapproval: Theory and experiments," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 527-541, August.
    3. Matteo Rizzolli & James Tremewan, 2016. "Hard Labour in the lab: Are monetary and non-monetary sanctions really substitutable?," Vienna Economics Papers vie1606, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    4. Adam Zylbersztejn, 2013. "Strategic signaling or emotional sanctioning? An experimental study of ex post communication in a repeated public goods game," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 13011, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    5. Davide Dragone & Fabio Galeotti & Raimondello Orsini, 2017. "Non-Monetary Feedback Induces More Cooperation: Students and Workers in a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 68(5), pages 793-808.
    6. Mathieu Lefebvre & Anne Stenger, 2020. "Short- & long-term effects of monetary and non-monetary incentives to cooperate in public good games: An experiment," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(1), pages 1-17, January.
    7. Zvonimir Bašic & Parampreet C. Bindra & Daniela Glätzle-Rützler & Angelo Romano & Matthias Sutter & Claudia Zoller, 2024. "The roots of cooperation," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2024_02, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    8. Daniel A. Brent & Lata Gangadharan & Anca Mihut & Marie Claire Villeval, 2019. "Taxation, redistribution, and observability in social dilemmas," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 21(5), pages 826-846, October.
    9. Adam Zylbersztejn, 2014. "The predominant role of signal precision in experimental beauty contests," Working Papers 1443, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    10. Hu, Fangtingyu & Ben-Ner, Avner, 2020. "The effects of feedback on lying behavior: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 24-34.
    11. Matteo Rizzolli & James Tremewan, 2016. "Hard Labour in the lab: Are monetary and non-monetary sanctions really substitutable?," Vienna Economics Papers 1606, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    12. Maho Nakagawa & Mathieu Lefebvre & Anne Stenger, 2022. "Long-lasting effects of incentives and social preference: A public goods experiment," Post-Print hal-03777681, HAL.
    13. Adam Zylbersztejn, 2015. "Nonverbal Feedback, Strategic Signaling, and Nonmonetary Sanctioning: New Experimental Evidence from a Public Goods Game," Research in Experimental Economics, in: Replication in Experimental Economics, volume 18, pages 153-181, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    14. Charness, Gary & Cobo-Reyes, Ramón & Sánchez, Ángela, 2016. "The effect of charitable giving on workers’ performance: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PA), pages 61-74.
    15. Christens, Sven & Dannenberg, Astrid & Sachs, Florian, 2019. "Identification of individuals and groups in a public goods experiment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    16. Sven Christens & Astrid Dannenberg & Florian Sachs, 2017. "Identification of individuals and groups in a public goods experiment," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201755, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    17. Adam Zylbersztejn, 2013. "Strategic signaling or emotional sanctioning? An experimental study of ex post communication in a repeated public goods game," Post-Print halshs-00800587, HAL.

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