Taxation, redistribution and observability in social dilemmas
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Other versions of this item:
- Daniel A. Brent & Lata Gangadharan & Anca Mihut & Marie Claire Villeval, 2017. "Taxation, redistribution and observability in social dilemmas," Working Papers 1726, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
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KeywordsCommon Pool Resource game; taxation mechanisms; observability; cooperation; heterogeneity; experiment;
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2018-01-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2018-01-15 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-ENV-2018-01-15 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2018-01-15 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2018-01-15 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-LTV-2018-01-15 (Unemployment, Inequality & Poverty)
- NEP-PBE-2018-01-15 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2018-01-15 (Public Finance)
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