Sequential Provision of Public Goods
I consider the private provision of public goods in two stage games. If the agent who likes the public good least contributes first, the amount of the public good supplied will be the same as in the Nash equilibrium. If the agent who likes the public good most contributes first, less of the public good may be supplied. Similar results hold if the first mover is uncertain of the tastes of the other agent. If the agents bid for the right to move first, the agent who values the public good least will win. If each agent chooses the rate at which he will subsidize the other agent's contributions, the subsidies that support the Lindahl allocation are the unique equilibrium outcome. I also describe two related subsidy-setting games that yield Lindahl allocations in $n$-person games with general utility functions.}
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jorgen W, 1988. "Altruism and Time Consistency: The Economics of Fait Accompli," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(6), pages 1165-1182, December.
- Guttman, Joel M., 1986. "Matching behavior and collective action : Some experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 171-198, June.
- Theodore Groves & John Ledyard, 1976.
"Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the 'Free Rider Problem',"
144, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Groves, Theodore & Ledyard, John O, 1977. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 783-809, May.
- L. Hurwicz, 1979. "Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 217-225.
- Theodore Groves, 1979. "Efficient Collective Choice when Compensation is Possible," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 227-241.
- Guttman, Joel M, 1987. "A Non-Cournot Model of Voluntary Collective Action," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 54(213), pages 1-19, February.
- Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
- Guttman, Joel M, 1978. "Understanding Collective Action: Matching Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 251-255, May.
- Danziger, Leif & Schnytzer, Adi, 1991. "Implementing the Lindahl voluntary-exchange mechanism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 55-64, April.
- Anat R. Admati & Motty Perry, 1991. "Joint Projects without Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 259-276.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:9401003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.