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Matching behavior and collective action : Some experimental evidence

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  • Guttman, Joel M.

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  • Guttman, Joel M., 1986. "Matching behavior and collective action : Some experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 171-198, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:7:y:1986:i:2:p:171-198
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Machina, Mark J, 1982. ""Expected Utility" Analysis without the Independence Axiom," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 277-323, March.
    2. Karni, Edi & Safra, Zvi, 1990. "Rank-Dependent Probabilities," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(401), pages 487-495, June.
    3. Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 263-291.
    4. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1970. "Increasing risk: I. A definition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 225-243.
    5. Quiggin, John, 1982. "A theory of anticipated utility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, pages 323-343.
    6. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 1985. "Input versus output incentive schemes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-23, October.
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    1. repec:kap:enreec:v:67:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s10640-017-0126-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Simon Gaechter & Daniele Nosenzo & Elke Renner & Martin Sefton, 2009. "Sequential versus Simultaneous Contributions to Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 2602, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gaechter, 2008. "Heterogeneous Social Preferences And The Dynamics Of Free Riding In Public Good Experiments," Discussion Papers 2008-07, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    4. Esteban F. Klor & Sebastian Kube & Eyal Winter & Ro'i Zultan, 2011. "Can Higher Bonuses Lead to Less E ort? Incentive Reversal in Teams," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000073, David K. Levine.
    5. Guttman, Joel M., 2013. "On the evolution of conditional cooperation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, pages 15-34.
    6. Varian, H.R., 1989. "Sequential Provision Of Public Goods," Papers 89-17, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
    7. Depken II, Craig A. & Redmount, Esther & Snow, Arthur, 2001. "Shirking and the choice of technology: a theory of production inefficiency with an empirical application," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(4), pages 383-402, April.
    8. Bornstein, Gary & Winter, Eyal & Goren, Harel, 1996. "Experimental study of repeated team-games," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, pages 629-639.
    9. Armin Falk & Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gaechter, 2009. "Living in Two Neighborhoods – Social Interaction Effects in the Lab," Discussion Papers 2009-01, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    10. Reif, Christiane & Rübbelke, Dirk & Löschel, Andreas, 2014. "Improving voluntary public good provision by a non-governmental, endogenous matching mechanism: Experimental evidence," ZEW Discussion Papers 14-075, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    11. Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gachter, 2010. "Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 541-556.
    12. Alexander Smith, 2013. "Estimating the causal effect of beliefs on contributions in repeated public good games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, pages 414-425.
    13. Reif, Christiane & Rübbelke, Dirk & Löschel, Andreas, 2014. "Improving voluntary public good provision by a non-governmental, endogenous matching mechanism: Experimental evidence," CAWM Discussion Papers 73, University of Münster, Center of Applied Economic Research Münster (CAWM).
    14. Eva-Maria Steiger & Ro'i Zultan, 2011. "See No Evil: Information Chains and Reciprocity in Teams," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-040, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    15. Guillen, Pablo & Fatas, Enrique & Brañas-Garza, Pablo, 2010. "Inducing efficient conditional cooperation patterns in public goods games, an experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, pages 872-883.
    16. Gong, Ning & Grundy, Bruce D., 2014. "The design of charitable fund-raising schemes: Matching grants or seed money," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, pages 147-165.
    17. Steiger, Eva-Maria & Zultan, Ro'i, 2014. "See no evil: Information chains and reciprocity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 1-12.
    18. Klor, Esteban F. & Kube, Sebastian & Winter, Eyal & Zultan, Ro’i, 2014. "Can higher rewards lead to less effort? Incentive reversal in teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, pages 72-83.
    19. Bogetic, Zeljko & Hillman, Arye L., 1994. "The tax base in transition : the case of Bulgaria," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1267, The World Bank.
    20. Guillen, Pablo & Fatas, Enrique & Brañas-Garza, Pablo, 2010. "Inducing efficient conditional cooperation patterns in public goods games, an experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, pages 872-883.
    21. Guttman, Joel M., 2000. "On the evolutionary stability of preferences for reciprocity," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, pages 31-50.
    22. Sefton, Martin & Steinberg, Richard, 1996. "Reward structures in public good experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 263-287.

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