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Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research

  • J. Ledyard

Environments with public goods are a wonderful playground for those interested in delicate experimental problems, serious theoretical challenges, and difficult mechanism design issues. A review is made of various public goods experiments. It is found that the public goods environment is a very sensitive one with much that can affect outcomes but are difficult to control. The many factors interact with each other in unknown ways. Nothing is known for sure. Environments with public goods present a serious challenge even to skilled experimentalists and many opportunities for imaginative work.

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 509.

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Date of creation: 01 Aug 1997
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:509
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