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Non-verbal feedback, strategic signaling and non- monetary sanctioning: new experimental evidence from a public goods game

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  • Adam Zylbersztejn

    () (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENS LSH - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Several experiments show that feedback transmission mechanisms mitigate opportunistic behavior in social dilemmas. The source of this effect, especially in a repeated interaction, nonetheless remains obscure. This study provides a novel empirical testbed for channels by which feedback may affect behavior in a repeated public goods game. One is related to strategic signaling. The other involves aversion to others' expressed disapproval. The presence of feedback is found to foster pro-social behavior. The data favour the non-monetary sanctioning explanation rather than the signaling hypothesis.

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  • Adam Zylbersztejn, 2014. "Non-verbal feedback, strategic signaling and non- monetary sanctioning: new experimental evidence from a public goods game," Working Papers halshs-01098775, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01098775
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01098775
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    Cited by:

    1. Davide Dragone & Fabio Galeotti & Raimondello Orsini, 2017. "Non-Monetary Feedback Induces More Cooperation: Students and Workers in a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 68(5), pages 793-808.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public go o ds game; Voluntary Contribution Mechanism; Feedback; Signaling; Non-monetary sanctioning;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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