Strategic signaling or emotional sanctioning? An experimental study of ex post communication in a repeated public goods game
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- Adam Zylbersztejn, 2013. "Strategic signaling or emotional sanctioning? An experimental study of ex post communication in a repeated public goods game," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00800587, HAL.
- Adam Zylbersztejn, 2014. "Strategic signaling or emotional sanctioning? An experimental study of ex post communication in a repeated public goods game," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp161, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
- Adam Zylbersztejn, 2013. "Strategic signaling or emotional sanctioning? An experimental study of ex post communication in a repeated public goods game," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 13011, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
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Cited by:
- Behnk, Sascha & Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván & García-Gallego, Aurora, 2019. "Deception and reputation – An experimental test of reporting systems," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 37-58.
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Keywords
Public goods game; Voluntary Contribution Mechanism; Ex post communication;JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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