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Distributional Preferences Explain Individual Behavior Across Games and Time

Author

Listed:
  • Morten Hedegaard

    (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Denmark)

  • Rudolf Kerschbamer

    (University of Innsbruck, Austria)

  • Daniel Müler

    (University of Innsbruck, Austria)

  • Jean-Robert Tyran

    (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Denmark)

Abstract

We use a large and heterogeneous sample of the Danish population to investigate the importance of distributional preferences for behavior in a public good game and a trust game. We find robust evidence for the significant explanatory power of distributional preferences. In fact, compared to twenty-one covariates, distributional preferences turn out to be the single most important predictor of behavior. Specifically, subjects who reveal benevolence in the domain of advantageous inequality contribute more to the public good and are more likely to pick the trustworthy action in the trust game than other subjects. Since the experiments were spread out more than one year, our results suggest that there is a component of distributional preferences that is stable across games and over time.

Suggested Citation

  • Morten Hedegaard & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Daniel Müler & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2019. "Distributional Preferences Explain Individual Behavior Across Games and Time," Discussion Papers 19-06, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1906
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    Cited by:

    1. Ola Andersson & Håkan J. Holm & Jean-Robert Tyran & Erik Wengström, 2020. "Robust inference in risk elicitation tasks," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 195-209, December.
    2. Friederike Mengel & Elke Weidenholzer, 2023. "Preferences for redistribution," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(5), pages 1660-1677, December.
    3. Müller, Daniel, 2019. "The anatomy of distributional preferences with group identity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 785-807.
    4. Malte Baader & Simon Gaechter & Kyeongtae Lee & Martin Sefton, 2022. "Social preferences and the variability of conditional cooperation," Discussion Papers 2022-13, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    5. Fehr, Dietmar & Müller, Daniel & Preuss, Marcel, 2024. "Social mobility perceptions and inequality acceptance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 221(C), pages 366-384.
    6. Philipp Jaschke & Sekou Keita & Ehsan Vallizadeh & Simon Kühne, 2023. "Satisfaction with pandemic management and compliance with public health measures: Evidence from a German household survey on the COVID-19 crisis," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 18(2), pages 1-21, February.
    7. Thomas Epper & Julien Senn & Ernst Fehr, 2023. "Social preferences across subject pools: students vs. general population," ECON - Working Papers 435, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jan 2024.
    8. Reindl, Ilona & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2021. "Equal opportunities for all? How income redistribution promotes support for economic inclusion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 390-407.
    9. Henrike Sternberg & Janina Isabel Steinert & Tim Büthe, 2025. "Inequality aversion and international distribution preferences: The case of the Covid-19 vaccine rollout," Munich Papers in Political Economy 43, Munich School of Politics and Public Policy and the School of Management at the Technical University of Munich.

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers

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