Testing Game Theory
Experimentalists frequently claim that human subjects playing games in the laboratory violate such solution concepts as Nash equilibrium and subgame perfection. This claim is premature. What has been rejected are certain joint hypotheses about preferences, knowledge, and behavior. This note strives to clarify some issues in connection with laboratory experiments, from the viewpoint of non-cooperative game theory, and provides a sketch for a research program for experimental testing of game-theoretic solution concepts.
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|Date of creation:||10 May 2000|
|Date of revision:||16 Apr 2002|
|Publication status:||Published in Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour: Game Theory, Experiments and Bounded Rationality. Essay in Honour of Werner Güth, Huck, S. (eds.), 2004, pages 85-104, Palgrave .|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden|
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