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Who’ll stop lying under oath? Empirical evidence from tax evasion games

Author

Listed:
  • Nicolas Jacquemet

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Stephane Luchini

    (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • A. Malézieux

    (CEREN - Centre de Recherche sur l'ENtreprise [Dijon] - BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC))

  • Jason F. Shogren

    (UW - University of Wyoming)

Abstract

Using two earned income/tax declaration experimental designs we show that only partial liars are affected by a truth-telling oath, a non-price commitment device. Under oath, we see no change in the number of chronic liars and fewer partial liars. Rather than smoothly increasing their compliance, we also observe that partial liars who respond to the oath, respond by becoming fully honest under oath. Based on both response times data and the consistency of subjects when several compliance decisions are made in a row, we show that partial lying arises as the result of weak preferences towards profitable honesty. The oath only transforms people with weak preferences for lying into being committed to the truth.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & A. Malézieux & Jason F. Shogren, 2020. "Who’ll stop lying under oath? Empirical evidence from tax evasion games," Post-Print hal-02576845, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02576845
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103369
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://amu.hal.science/hal-02576845v2
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    Cited by:

    1. Nicolas Jacquemet & Alexander G James & Stéphane Luchini & James J Murphy & Jason F Shogren, 2021. "Do truth-telling oaths improve honesty in crowd-working?," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(1), pages 1-18, January.
    2. Miloš Fišar & Tommaso Reggiani & Fabio Sabatini & Jiří Špalek, 2022. "Media negativity bias and tax compliance: experimental evidence," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 29(5), pages 1160-1212, October.
    3. Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & J Rosaz & J F Shogren, 2021. "Can we commit future managers to honesty?," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03277342, HAL.
    4. Antoine Malézieux & Benno Torgler, 2021. "Culture, Immigration and Tax Compliance," CREMA Working Paper Series 2021-23, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    5. Jacquemet, Nicolas & Luchini, Stéphane & Malézieux, Antoine, 2021. "Does voting on tax fund destination imply a direct democracy effect?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    6. Akın, Zafer, 2023. "Direct lying or playing the victim? An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 216(C), pages 150-169.
    7. Nicolas Jacquemet, 2025. "Understanding Behaviour for Effective Public Policy-Making," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-05131085, HAL.
    8. Janis Zickfeld & Karolina Scigala & Christian Elbaek & John Michael & Mathilde Tønning Tønnesen & Gabriel Levy & Shahar Ayal & Isabel Thielmann & Laila Nockur & Eyal Peer & Valerio Capraro & Rachel Ba, 2024. "I Solemnly Swear I'm Up To Good: A Megastudy Investigating the Effectiveness of Honesty Oaths on Curbing Dishonesty," Working Papers halshs-04555561, HAL.
    9. Banerjee, Sanchayan & Picard, Julien, 2023. "Thinking through norms can make them more effective. Experimental evidence on reflective climate policies in the UK," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 120057, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    10. Ekström, Mathias & Bjorvatn, Kjetil & Mota, Pablo Soto & Sjåstad, Hallgeir, 2025. "Making a promise increases the moral cost of lying: Evidence from Norway and the United States," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 233(C).
    11. James Alm & Antoine Malézieux, 2021. "40 years of tax evasion games: a meta-analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(3), pages 699-750, September.
    12. Vaz, João & Shogren, Jason, 2023. "Cooperation under oath: A case for context-dependent preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 229(C).
    13. Nicolas Jacquemet & Céline Launay & Stéphane Luchini & Danica Mijovic-Prelec & Drazen Prelec & Jacques Py & Julie Rosaz & Jason F. Shogren, 2024. "Does the oath enhance truth-telling in eyewitness testimony? Experimental Evidence," Post-Print halshs-04855141, HAL.
    14. Akin, Zafer, 2022. "Playing the victim behavior: an experimental study," MPRA Paper 115532, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Jacquemet, Nicolas & Luchini, Stéphane & Shogren, Jason F. & Zylbersztejn, Adam, 2024. "Commitment to the truth creates trust in market exchange: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 279-295.
    16. Beck, Tobias, 2021. "How the honesty oath works: Quick, intuitive truth telling under oath," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 94(C).

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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