Tax Audits as Scarecrows: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment
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More about this item
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2017-08-06 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2017-08-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2017-08-06 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-IUE-2017-08-06 (Informal & Underground Economics)
- NEP-LAM-2017-08-06 (Central & South America)
- NEP-LAW-2017-08-06 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2017-08-06 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2017-08-06 (Public Finance)
- NEP-UPT-2017-08-06 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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