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Effects of Tax Morale on Tax Compliance: Experimental and Survey Evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Cummings, Ronald G.
  • Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge
  • McKee, Michael
  • Torgler, Benno

Abstract

There is considerable evidence that enforcement efforts can increase tax compliance. However, there must be other forces at work because observed compliance levels cannot be fully explained by the level of enforcement actions typical of most tax authorities. Further, there are observed differences, not related to enforcement effort, in the levels of compliance across countries and cultures. To fully understand differences in compliance behavior across cultures one needs to understand differences in tax administration and citizen attitudes toward governments. The working hypothesis is that cross-cultural differences in behavior have foundations in these institutions. Tax compliance is a complex behavioral issue and its investigation requires the use of a variety of methods and data sources. Results from laboratory experiments conducted in different countries demonstrate that observed differences in tax compliance levels can be explained by differences in the fairness of tax administration, in the perceived fiscal exchange, and in the overall attitude towards the respective governments. These experimental results are shown to be robust by replicating them for the same countries using survey response measures of tax compliance.

Suggested Citation

  • Cummings, Ronald G. & Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge & McKee, Michael & Torgler, Benno, 2006. "Effects of Tax Morale on Tax Compliance: Experimental and Survey Evidence," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt8sh2w9fp, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:cdl:oplwec:qt8sh2w9fp
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    Cited by:

    1. Frey, Bruno S. & Torgler, Benno, 2007. "Tax morale and conditional cooperation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 136-159, March.
    2. Andrew E. Clark & David Masclet & Marie Claire Villeval, 2010. "Effort and Comparison Income: Experimental and Survey Evidence," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 63(3), pages 407-426, April.
    3. Benno Torgler & Friedrich Schneider, 2007. "What Shapes Attitudes Toward Paying Taxes? Evidence from Multicultural European Countries," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 88(2), pages 443-470.
    4. Coricelli, Giorgio & Joffily, Mateus & Montmarquette, Claude & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2007. "Tax Evasion: Cheating Rationally or Deciding Emotionally?," IZA Discussion Papers 3103, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    5. Filippin, Antonio & Fiorio, Carlo V. & Viviano, Eliana, 2013. "The effect of tax enforcement on tax morale," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 320-331.
    6. Vitor Gaspar & Laura Jaramillo & Philippe Wingender, 2016. "Tax Capacity and Growth; Is there a Tipping Point?," IMF Working Papers 16/234, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Castro, Lucio & Scartascini, Carlos, 2015. "Tax compliance and enforcement in the pampas evidence from a field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 65-82.
    8. Cevat Bilgin, 2014. "Determinants of tax morale in Spain and Turkey: an empirical analysis," European Journal of Government and Economics, Europa Grande, vol. 3(1), pages 60-74, June.
    9. DeBacker, Jason & Heim, Bradley T. & Tran, Anh, 2015. "Importing corruption culture from overseas: Evidence from corporate tax evasion in the United States," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 122-138.
    10. Onu, Diana & Oats, Lynne, 2016. "“Paying tax is part of life”: Social norms and social influence in tax communications," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 29-42.
    11. Simon Gaechter, 2006. "Conditional cooperation: Behavioral regularities from the lab and the field and their policy implications," Discussion Papers 2006-03, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    12. Battiston, Pietro & Gamba, Simona, 2016. "The impact of social pressure on tax compliance: A field experiment," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 78-85.
    13. Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr. & Violeta Piculescu, 2008. "Tax Toleration and Tax Compliance: How Government Affects the Propensity of Firms to Enter the Unofficial Economy," Discussion Papers 7_2008, D.E.S. (Department of Economic Studies), University of Naples "Parthenope", Italy.
    14. Benno Torgler & Christoph A. Schaltegger, 2006. "Tax Morale: A Survey with a Special Focus on Switzerland," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 142(III), pages 395-425, September.
    15. Andrew Clark & Davis Masclet & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2006. "Effort and Comparison Income : Survey and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 0601, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    16. Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Klarita Gërxhani, 2011. "Financial Satisfaction and (in)formal Sector in a Transition Country," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 102(2), pages 315-331, June.
    17. Fochmann, Martin & Kroll, Eike B., 2014. "The effects of rewards on tax compliance decisions," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 163, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    18. Daniel Ortega & Carlos Scartascini, 2015. "Don't Blame the Messenger: A Field Experiment on Delivery Methods for Increasing Tax Compliance," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 91741, Inter-American Development Bank.
    19. S. Sookram & P. K. Watson & F. Schneider, 2009. "Characteristics of households in the informal sector of an emerging economy," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(27), pages 3545-3559.
    20. Sandra Sookram & Patrick Kent Watson, 2008. "Small-Business Participation in the Informal Sector of an Emerging Economy," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(10), pages 1531-1553.
    21. Daniel Ortega & Carlos Scartascini, 2015. "Don't Blame the Messenger: A Field Experiment on Delivery Methods for Increasing Tax Compliance," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 7284, Inter-American Development Bank.
    22. Simone Pellegrino & Massimiliano Piacenza & Gilberto Turati, 2008. "The Runaway Taxpayer or: Is Prior Tax Notice Effective against Scofflaws?," Working papers 01, Former Department of Economics and Public Finance "G. Prato", University of Torino.
    23. repec:eee:ecosys:v:41:y:2017:i:3:p:354-366 is not listed on IDEAS
    24. Mutascu, Mihai, 2011. "Compulsory voting and tax revenues," MPRA Paper 33987, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    25. Fochmann, Martin & Kroll, Eike B., 2016. "The effects of rewards on tax compliance decisions," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 38-55.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    H20; C90;

    JEL classification:

    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General

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