Limited Liability and Imperfect Information—On the Existence of Safety Equilibria Under Products Liability Law
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ram Singh, 2003. "Efficiency of 'Simple' Liability Rules When Courts Make Erroneous Estimation of the Damage," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 39-58, July.
- Ram Singh, 2001.
"Effects of Courts' Errors on Efficiency of Liability Rules: When Individuals are Imperfectly Informed,"
97, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Ram Singh, 2009. "Effects of Court Errors on Efficiency of Liability Rules: When Individuals are Imperfectly Informed," Working Papers id:2291, eSocialSciences.
- Ram Singh, 2009.
"RISK, INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRY AND PRODUCT LIABILITY: An Enquiry Into Conflicting Objectives,"
Pacific Economic Review,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(1), pages 89-112, February.
- Ram Singh, 2008. "Risk, Informational Asymmetry and Product Liability: An Enquiry into Conflicting Objectives," Working Papers id:1466, eSocialSciences.
- Ram Singh, 2008. "Risk, Informational Asymmetry and Product Liability; An enquiry into conflicting objectives," Working papers 164, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
More about this item
KeywordsTort Law; Product Liability; Product Safety; Mixed Strategy Equilibrium; Imperfect Information;
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