Efficiency of 'Simple' Liability Rules When Courts Make Erroneous Estimation of the Damage
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References listed on IDEAS
- Rasmusen, Eric, 1995. "Predictable and unpredictable error in tort awards: The effect of plaintiff self-selection and signaling," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 323-345, September.
- Peter Van Wijck & Jan Winters, 2001. "The Principle of Full Compensation in Tort Law," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 319-332, May.
- Alfred Endres & Andreas Lüdeke, 1998. "Limited Liability and Imperfect Information—On the Existence of Safety Equilibria Under Products Liability Law," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 153-165, March.
- Feldman, Allan M. & Frost, John M., 1998. "A simple model of efficient tort liability rules," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 201-215, June.
- repec:kap:jeczfn:v:75:y:2002:i:2:d:10.1007_s007120200008 is not listed on IDEAS
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Parisi Francesco & Singh Ram, 2010. "The Efficiency of Comparative Causation," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 219-245, September.
- Ram Singh, 2004. "‘Full’ Compensation Criteria: An Enquiry into Relative Merits," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 223-237, September.
- Ram Singh, 2009.
"RISK, INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRY AND PRODUCT LIABILITY: An Enquiry Into Conflicting Objectives,"
Pacific Economic Review,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(1), pages 89-112, February.
- Ram Singh, 2008. "Risk, Informational Asymmetry and Product Liability; An enquiry into conflicting objectives," Working papers 164, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Ram Singh, 2008. "Risk, Informational Asymmetry and Product Liability: An Enquiry into Conflicting Objectives," Working Papers id:1466, eSocialSciences.
- Tim Friehe, 2007. "On the incentive effects of damage averaging in tort law," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 11(2), pages 1-7.
- Ram Singh, 2016. "â€˜Fullâ€™ Compensation Criteria in the Law of Torts: An Enquiry into the Doctrine of Causation," Working Papers id:11237, eSocialSciences.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:11:y:2007:i:2:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
Keywordscourt errors; liability rules; simple liability rules; total social costs; efficient liability rules; negligent injurer's liability; Nash equilibrium;
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