IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ess/wpaper/id2681.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Efficiency Of Comparative Causation

Author

Listed:
  • Ram Singh
  • Francesco Parisi

Abstract

Comparative causation is the only tort regime that allows parties to share an accident loss in equilibrium. The sharing of an accident loss between a nonnegligent injurer and his nonnegligent victim spreads activity level and R&D incentives between prospective tortfeasors and their victims. This is an e ffect that is never observed under the other negligence and strict liability based regimes. In spite of these interesting attributes, the existing literature left open the question as to whether loss sharing was able to maintain optimal care incentives for both parties. In this paper, we address this unresolved issue in the literature, considering the effeciency of loss-sharing under comparative causation. [Working Paper No. 179]

Suggested Citation

  • Ram Singh & Francesco Parisi, 2010. "The Efficiency Of Comparative Causation," Working Papers id:2681, eSocialSciences.
    • Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2681
    Note: Institutional Papers
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.esocialsciences.org/Download/repecDownload.aspx?fname=Document12072010580.3570368.pdf&fcategory=Articles&AId=2681&fref=repec
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ram Singh, 2006. "On the Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria under Liability Rules," Working papers 150, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    2. Cooter, Robert, 1998. "Expressive Law and Economics," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 585-608, June.
    3. Peter Van Wijck & Jan Winters, 2001. "The Principle of Full Compensation in Tort Law," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 319-332, May.
    4. Lando, Henrik, 1997. "An attempt to incorporate fairness into an economic model of tort law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 575-587, December.
    5. Singh, Ram, 2007. "‘Causation-consistent’ liability, economic efficiency and the law of torts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 179-203.
    6. Ram Singh, 2003. "Efficiency of 'Simple' Liability Rules When Courts Make Erroneous Estimation of the Damage," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 39-58, July.
    7. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, 1991. "Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 562-570, Winter.
    8. Hylton, Keith N., 2002. "An asymmetric-information model of litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 153-175, August.
    9. Singh Ram, 2007. "Comparative Causation and Economic Efficiency: When Activity Levels are Constant," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(2), pages 383-406, December.
    10. Cooter, Robert, 1998. "Expressive Law and Economics," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt3w34j60j, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    11. Yu-Ping Liao & Michelle J. White, 2002. "No-Fault for Motor Vehicles: An Economic Analysis," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 258-294.
    12. Allan M. Feldman & Ram Singh, 2009. "Comparative Vigilance," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 134-161.
    13. Edlin, Aaron S., 1994. "Efficient standards of due care: Should courts find more parties negligent under comparative negligence?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 21-34, March.
    14. Rea, Samuel Jr., 1987. "The economics of comparative negligence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 149-162, December.
    15. Chung, Tai-Yeong, 1993. "Efficiency of Comparative Negligence: A Game Theoretic Analysis," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 395-404, June.
    16. Satish K. Jain & Ram Singh, 2002. "Efficient Liability Rules: Complete Characterization," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 75(2), pages 105-124, March.
    17. Kahan, Marcel, 1989. "Causation and Incentives to Take Care under the Negligence Rule," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(2), pages 427-447, June.
    18. Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, 2003. "The Uneasy Case for Comparative Negligence," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 433-469, August.
    19. Schweizer, Urs, 2009. "Legal damages for losses of chances," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 153-160, June.
    20. Miceli, Thomas J., 1997. "Economics of the Law: Torts, Contracts, Property, Litigation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195103908.
    21. David Kaye & Mikel Aickin, 1984. "A Comment on Causal Apportionment," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 191-208, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi, 2014. "Loss-Sharing between Nonnegligent Parties," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 170(4), pages 571-598, December.
    2. Feldman Allan & Singh Ram, 2021. "Equilibria Under Negligence Liability: How the Standard Claims Fall Apart," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 1-33, March.
    3. Samuel Ferey & Pierre Dehez, 2016. "Multiple Causation, Apportionment, and the Shapley Value," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 143-171.
    4. Lando, Henrik & Schweizer, Urs, 2021. "Causation and the incentives of multiple injurers," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    5. Dehez, Pierre & Ferey, Samuel, 2013. "How to share joint liability: A cooperative game approach," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 44-50.
    6. Takayuki Oishi & Gerard van der Laan & René van den Brink, 2023. "Axiomatic analysis of liability problems with rooted-tree networks in tort law," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(1), pages 229-258, January.
    7. Acciarri Hugo A. & Tohmé Fernando & Castellano Andrea, 2016. "Causal Apportionment of Tort Liability: An Efficient Approach," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 37-55, March.
    8. Dari-Mattiacci Giuseppe & Hendriks Eva S., 2013. "Relative Fault and Efficient Negligence: Comparative Negligence Explained," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-40, June.
    9. Allan M Feldman & Ram Singh, 2021. "Equilibria under Liability Rules: How the standard claims fall apart," Working papers 315, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    10. Diego M. Papayannis, 2016. "El derecho privado como cuestión pública. Serie de Teoría Jurídica y Filosofía del Derecho N.º 75," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Derecho, number 818, December.
    11. Jain Satish K. & Kundu Rajendra P., 2015. "Decomposition of Accident Loss and Efficiency of Liability Rules," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 453-480, November.
    12. Emanuela Carbonara & Alice Guerra & Francesco Parisi, 2016. "Sharing Residual Liability: The Cheapest Cost Avoider Revisited," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 173-201.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. FRANCESCO PARISI & Ram Singh, 2009. "Efficiency Of Equilibria Under Comparative Causation," Working papers 179, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    2. Ram Singh, 2006. "On the Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria under Liability Rules," Working papers 150, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    3. Singh, Ram, 2007. "‘Causation-consistent’ liability, economic efficiency and the law of torts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 179-203.
    4. Allan M. Feldman & Ram Singh, 2009. "Comparative Vigilance," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 134-161.
    5. Allan M Feldman & Ram Singh, 2008. "Comparative Vigilance: a Simple Guide," Working Papers 2008-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    6. Ram Singh, 2005. "Comparative Causation -- A Re-examination," Working papers 139, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    7. Allan M. Feldman & Ram Singh, 2009. "Comparative Vigilance," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 134-161.
    8. Feldman Allan & Singh Ram, 2021. "Equilibria Under Negligence Liability: How the Standard Claims Fall Apart," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 1-33, March.
    9. Ram Singh, 2016. "‘Full’ Compensation Criteria in the Law of Torts: An Enquiry into the Doctrine of Causation," Working Papers id:11237, eSocialSciences.
    10. Ram Singh, 2002. "Causation, Economic Efficiency and the Law of Torts," Working papers 102, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    11. Feldman Allan M. & Singh Ram, 2011. "A Simple Guide to Comparative Vigilance," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(3), pages 1-24, October.
    12. Allan M Feldman & Ram Singh, 2021. "Equilibria under Liability Rules: How the standard claims fall apart," Working papers 315, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    13. Dari-Mattiacci Giuseppe & Hendriks Eva S., 2013. "Relative Fault and Efficient Negligence: Comparative Negligence Explained," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-40, June.
    14. Ram Singh, 2001. "Efficient Liability Rules When Courts Make Errors in Estimation of the Harm : Complete Characterization," Working papers 99, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    15. Jain Satish K. & Kundu Rajendra P., 2015. "Decomposition of Accident Loss and Efficiency of Liability Rules," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 453-480, November.
    16. Nuno Garoupa, 2009. "Least-Cost Avoidance: The Tragedy of Common Safety," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(1), pages 235-261, May.
    17. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Gerrit De Geest, 2005. "The Filtering Effect of Sharing Rules," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 207-237, January.
    18. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi, 2014. "Loss-Sharing between Nonnegligent Parties," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 170(4), pages 571-598, December.
    19. Steven Shavell, 2005. "Liability for Accidents," NBER Working Papers 11781, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Ram Singh, 2004. "‘Full’ Compensation Criteria: An Enquiry into Relative Merits," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 223-237, September.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2681. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Padma Prakash (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.esocialsciences.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.