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On the Evolutionary Dynamics of Crime

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Listed:
  • Ross Cressman
  • Jean-Francois Wen
  • William Morrison

Abstract

In this paper, the authors examine the economics of crime deterrence from an evolutionary perspective. A bimatrix game is used to model the interaction between populations of property owners and (potential) criminals, given exogenous levels of public policing and criminal sanctions. A crucial element in the authors' analysis is the private effort property owners exert to prevent theft. The dynamics show that the crime rate is cyclical over time and the average crime rate over the cycle is invariant to the magnitude of criminal sanctions. Furthermore, increased public policing raises the average crime rate until a threshold level of policing is reached where the crime rate falls.

Suggested Citation

  • Ross Cressman & Jean-Francois Wen & William Morrison, 1998. "On the Evolutionary Dynamics of Crime," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(5), pages 1101-1117, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:31:y:1998:i:5:p:1101-1117
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Luciano Andreozzi, 2008. "Inspection games with long-run inspectors," Department of Economics Working Papers 0821, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    2. GholamReza Keshavarz Haddad & Hamed Markazi Moghadam, 2011. "The socioeconomic and demographic determinants of crime in Iran (a regional panel study)," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 99-114, August.
    3. da Silva Rocha, Andre Barreira, 2010. "An Evolutionary Game Approach to the Issues of Migration, Nationalism, Assimilation and Enclaves," Economics Discussion Papers 8945, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    4. Eaton, B.Curtis & Wen, Jean-François, 2008. "Myopic deterrence policies and the instability of equilibria," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 609-624, March.
    5. Barreira da Silva Rocha, André, 2013. "Evolutionary dynamics of nationalism and migration," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, pages 3183-3197.
    6. A. Antoci & S. Borghesi & G. Iannucci, 2016. "Green licenses and environmental corruption: a random matching model," Working Paper CRENoS 201615, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
    7. André Barreira da Silva Rocha, 2013. "An Evolutionary Game for the Issues of Social Investment, Environmental Compliance and Consumer Boycott," Discussion Papers in Economics 13/17, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.
    8. Wilson, Dennis P., 2005. "Additional law enforcement as a deterrent to criminal behavior: empirical evidence from the National Hockey League," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 319-330, May.
    9. Rocha, André Barreira da Silva & Laruelle, Annick & Zuazo Garín, Peio, 2011. "Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Heterogeneous Games," IKERLANAK 2011-57, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    10. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Bezalel Peleg, 2000. "Co-evolution of Preferences and Information in Simple Games of Trust," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 1(1), pages 83-110, February.
    11. Arce, Daniel G., 2010. "Corporate virtue: Treatment of whistle blowers and the punishment of violators," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 363-371, September.
    12. Lipatov, Vilen, 2008. "Social Interaction in Tax Evasion," MPRA Paper 8829, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Lipatov, Vilen, 2003. "Evolution of Tax Evasion," MPRA Paper 966, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Dec 2005.
    14. Shahi, Chander & Kant, Shashi, 2007. "An evolutionary game-theoretic approach to the strategies of community members under Joint Forest Management regime," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(7), pages 763-775, April.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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