An Evolutionary Game for the Issues of Social Investment, Environmental Compliance and Consumer Boycott
I propose an evolutionary game model to study competition among a large number of firms, in which I take into account the issues of social responsibility, government monitoring of environmental compliance and consumer boycott. A large number of firms sell their homogeneous good in an almost perfect competitive market, where consumers have preferences for socially responsible firms. Firms may incur additional costs and carry out social investment and/or environmental investment. Each time interval, a firm may be called to play a competition-stage game, in which it tries to sell its good, or an audit-stage game, in which inspectors audit its degree of environmental compliance.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2013|
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- Barreira da Silva Rocha, André, 2013.
"Evolutionary dynamics of nationalism and migration,"
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications,
Elsevier, vol. 392(15), pages 3183-3197.
- André Barreira da Silva Rocha, 2012. "Evolutionary Dynamics of Nationalism and Migration," Discussion Papers in Economics 12/11, Department of Economics, University of Leicester, revised Jun 2012.
- Anastasopoulos, Nikolaos P. & Anastasopoulos, Markos P., 2012. "The evolutionary dynamics of audit," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 216(2), pages 469-476.
- Ross Cressman & Jean-Francois Wen & William Morrison, 1998. "On the Evolutionary Dynamics of Crime," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(5), pages 1101-1117, November.
- Carmen Arguedas & Hamid Hamoudi, 2004. "Controlling Pollution with Relaxed Regulations," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 85-104, 07.
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