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Közgazdaságtan a jogalkalmazásban
[Forensic economics]

Author

Listed:
  • Valentiny, Pál

Abstract

Az elmúlt években a jogalkalmazási közgazdaságtan (forensic economics) megkapta a közgazdasági szakmai körökben hivatalos elismerésnek számító JEL-kódot. A tanulmány e szakterület fogalma tisztázásának szándékával bemutatja a piac- és vállalatelmélet fejlődését és jogalkalmazáshoz való viszonyának változásait. A verseny- és ágazati szabályozásban használt vizsgálatokat, eljárásokat követve felvázolja a jog és közgazdaságtan, a jogászok és közgazdászok közötti kapcsolatokat, végül állást foglal abban a kérdésben, hogy létezik-e jogalkalmazási közgazdaságtan. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: K13, K21, K23, L40, L51

Suggested Citation

  • Valentiny, Pál, 2019. "Közgazdaságtan a jogalkalmazásban [Forensic economics]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 134-162.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1820
    DOI: 10.18414/KSZ.2019.2.134
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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