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Collusion in Industrial Economics—A Survey

  • Switgard Feuerstein


The aim of this paper is to summarize the theory of (implicit) collusion in the framework of infinitely repeated games, and in particular, to survey the comprehensive literature exploring which factors make collusion easier or more difficult to sustain. On this basis, the existing empirical studies and the experimental results will be discussed. Policy options as e.g. leniency programs are also analyzed. Although the number of clear cut policy conclusions is limited, understanding thoroughly the mechanisms of collusion is important for (anti-trust) policies. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

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Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade.

Volume (Year): 5 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Pages: 163-198

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Handle: RePEc:kap:jincot:v:5:y:2005:i:3:p:163-198
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