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Examining models of collusion: The market for lysine

  • de Roos, Nicolas

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.

Volume (Year): 24 (2006)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
Pages: 1083-1107

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Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:24:y:2006:i:6:p:1083-1107
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551

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  1. Lawrence White, 2001. "Lysine and Price Fixing: How Long? How Severe?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 23-31, February.
  2. Joseph E Harrington, 2001. "Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority," Economics Working Paper Archive 460, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Jul 2002.
  3. Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell & Chris Sanchirico, 1998. "Collusion and Price Rigidity," Working papers 98-23, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  4. Kihlstrom, R. & Vives, X., 1989. "Collusion By Asymmetricaly Informed Firms," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 125-89, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  5. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1995. "Collusion Over the Business Cycle," Discussion Papers 1118, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. William A. Brock & José A. Scheinkman, 1985. "Price Setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(3), pages 371-382.
  7. Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 1999. "Optimal Collusion with Private Information," Working papers 99-17, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  8. Slade, Margaret E., 1990. "Cheating on collusive agreements," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 519-543, December.
  9. Klepper, Steven, 1996. "Entry, Exit, Growth, and Innovation over the Product Life Cycle," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 562-83, June.
  10. Cramton, Peter C. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1986. "Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty About Costs," Working Papers 619, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  11. John M. Connor, 2000. "Archer Daniels Midland:Price Fixer To The World," Working Papers 00-11, Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics.
  12. Abreu, Dilip, 1986. "Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 191-225, June.
  13. Joseph E Harrington Jr, 2002. "Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority," Economics Working Paper Archive 487, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised May 2003.
  14. Compte, Olivier & Jenny, Frederic & Rey, Patrick, 2002. "Capacity constraints, mergers and collusion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January.
  15. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1991. "Entry deterrence and dynamic competition : The role of capacity reconsidered," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 477-495, December.
  16. Davidson, Carl & Deneckere, Raymond J, 1990. "Excess Capacity and Collusion," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(3), pages 521-41, August.
  17. Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna, 1987. "Dynamic Duopoly: Prices and Quantities," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(1), pages 23-35.
  18. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1991. "The Determination of Price and Output Quotas in a Heterogeneous Cartel," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(4), pages 767-92, November.
  19. Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1986. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 390-407, June.
  20. de Roos, Nicolas, 2004. "A model of collusion timing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 351-387, March.
  21. Joseph E Harrington Jr, 2002. "Post-Cartel Pricing during Litigation," Economics Working Paper Archive 488, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Jun 2003.
  22. Schmalensee, Richard, 1987. "Competitive advantage and collusive optima," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 351-367.
  23. John Connor, 2001. "“Our Customers Are Our Enemies”: The Lysine Cartel of 1992–1995," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 5-21, February.
  24. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1986. "Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 251-269, June.
  25. Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1989. "Collusion among asymmetric firms: The case of different discount factors," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 289-307, June.
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