Cooperation in the Presence of an Advantaged Outsider
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsRepeated Game; Tacit Collusion; Optimal Punishments; Cost Asymmetry; Outsider;
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-05-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-05-11 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2013-05-11 (Game Theory)
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