Asymmetric Cartels - a Theory of Ring Leaders
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- de Mesnard, Louis, 2009.
"Is the French mobile phone cartel really a cartel?,"
International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 663-677, December.
- Louis de Mesnard, 2009. "Is the French mobile phone cartel really a cartel?," Post-Print hal-00398663, HAL.
- Mesnard, Louis de, 2009. "Is the French mobile phone cartel really a cartel?," LEG - Document de travail - Economie 2009-02, LEG, Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne.
- Fumagalli, Eileen & Nilssen, Tore, 2008. "Waiting to Merge," Memorandum 13/2008, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
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"Cartel ringleaders and the corporate leniency program,"
Research Memorandum
038, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Iwan Bos & Frederick Wandschneider, 2011. "Cartel Ringleaders and the Corporate Leniency Program," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2011-13, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
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More about this item
Keywords
Collusion; Cost asymmetries; Merger policy; Cartels; Ring leader;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2008-05-31 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2008-05-31 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2008-05-31 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2008-05-31 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2008-05-31 (Regulation)
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