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Multimarket Linkages, Cartel Discipline and Trade Costs

Author

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  • Delina Agnosteva

    (Towson University)

  • Constantinos Syropoulos

    (Drexel University)

  • Yoto Yotov

    (Drexel University)

Abstract

We build a model of tacit collusion between firms that operate in multiple markets to study the effects of trade costs. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint. Importantly, trade costs affect cartel shipments and welfare not only directly but also indirectly through discipline. Using extensive data on international cartels, we find that trade costs exert a negative and significant effect on cartel discipline. In turn, cartel discipline has a negative and significant impact on trade flows, in line with the model.

Suggested Citation

  • Delina Agnosteva & Constantinos Syropoulos & Yoto Yotov, 2017. "Multimarket Linkages, Cartel Discipline and Trade Costs," School of Economics Working Paper Series 2017-12, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:drxlwp:2017_012
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    Cited by:

    1. Delina E. Agnosteva & Constantinos Syropoulos & Yoto V. Yotov, 2024. "Preferential trade liberalization with endogenous cartel discipline: Implications for trade and welfare," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 57(4), pages 1109-1136, November.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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