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Price Setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints


  • William A. Brock
  • José A. Scheinkman


This paper examines the role of industry capacity in enforcing collusion in the context of repeated games. For a fixed capacity per firm it is shown that changes in the number of firms have a non-monotone effect on the best enforceable cartel price. This is due to the fact that while an additional firm lowers the share that each of the other firms enjoys at the collusive price it also increases the losses to each firm should the cartel fail.

Suggested Citation

  • William A. Brock & José A. Scheinkman, 1985. "Price Setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(3), pages 371-382.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:52:y:1985:i:3:p:371-382.

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Morrison, C. J. & Berndt, E. R., 1981. "Short-run labor productivity in a dynamic model," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 339-365, August.
    2. J. M. Cassels, 1937. "Excess Capacity and Monopolistic Competition," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 426-443.
    3. Lau, Lawrence J., 1976. "A characterization of the normalized restricted profit function," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 131-163, February.
    4. Robert E. Lucas & Jr., 1967. "Adjustment Costs and the Theory of Supply," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 75, pages 321-321.
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