Excess Capacity and Collusion
In this paper, the authors analyze a restricted class of equilibria in the dynamic model of J. P. Benoit and V. Krishna (1987) in which firms choose their scale of operation before engaging in a repeated game of price competition. Benoit and Krishna established that all firms carry excess capacity in all collusive equilibria. As the authors are interested in the relationship between excess capacity and collusion in price, they examine equilibria in which firms tacitly collude in price, but not in investment decisions. Copyright 1990 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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- Esposito, Frances Ferguson & Esposito, Louis, 1974. "Excess Capacity and Market Structure," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 56(2), pages 188-194, May.
- Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1983.
"Price Competition in a Capacity-Constrained Duopoly,"
83-08, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1986. "Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 238-260, April.
- Mann, H Michael & Meehan, James W, Jr & Ramsay, Glen A, 1979. "Market Structure and Excess Capacity: A Look at Theory and Some Evidence," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 61(1), pages 156-159, February.
- Edward J Green & Robert H Porter, 1997.
"Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
1147, David K. Levine.
- Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
- Green, Edward J. & Porter, Robert H., 1982. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Working Papers 367, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1983.
"Cartels, Profits, and Excess Capacity,"
83-09, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce & Ennio Stacchetti, 1984. "Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 726, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- A. Michael Spence, 1977. "Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 534-544, Autumn.
- B. Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, 1981.
"Capital, Commitment, and Entry Equilibrium,"
Bell Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 593-604, Autumn.
- William A. Brock & José A. Scheinkman, 1985. "Price Setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(3), pages 371-382.
- James A. Brander & Richard Harris, 1983. "Anticipated Collusion and Excess Capacity," Working Papers 530, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Dixit, Avinash, 1980.
"The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(357), pages 95-106, March.
- Dixit, Avinash, 1979. "The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 140, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
- Judith R. Gelman & Steven C. Salop, 1983. "Judo Economics: Capacity Limitation and Coupon Competition," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 315-325, Autumn.
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