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Capital, Commitment, and Entry Equilibrium


  • B. Curtis Eaton
  • Richard G. Lipsey


A primary concern of recent oligopoly literature has been the use of product-specific capital to impose asymmetric market solutions, including the deterrence of entry. This article explores the surprisingly neglected topic of the correspondence between the nature of product-specific capital (PSC) and the properties of entry equilibrium. The nature of PSC determines the type of entry with which firms must be concerned (predatory entry, where the entrant replaces an existing firm, or augmenting entry, where the entrant does not), the instruments available to effect asymmetry, the ability to impose asymmetric solutions, and their profitability.

Suggested Citation

  • B. Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, 1981. "Capital, Commitment, and Entry Equilibrium," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 593-604, Autumn.
  • Handle: RePEc:rje:bellje:v:12:y:1981:i:autumn:p:593-604

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Samet, Dov & Tauman, Yair, 1982. "The Determination of Marginal Cost Prices under a Set of Axioms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 895-909, July.
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    1. Radhakrishnan, Suresh & Tsang, Albert, 2011. "The valuation-relevance of the foreign translation adjustment: The effect of barriers to entry," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 431-458.
    2. Davidson, Carl & Deneckere, Raymond J, 1990. "Excess Capacity and Collusion," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(3), pages 521-541, August.
    3. Ravi Kumar, K. & Hadjinicola, George C., 1996. "Resource allocation to defensive marketing and manufacturing strategies," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 94(3), pages 453-466, November.
    4. Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey, 1996. "Capacity, Entry, and Forward Induction," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(4), pages 660-680, Winter.
    5. Haw, In-Mu & Hu, Bingbing & Lee, Jay Junghun, 2015. "Product market competition and analyst forecasting activity: International evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 48-60.
    6. Ho, Simon S.M. & Li, Annie Yuansha & Tam, Kinsun & Tong, Jamie Y., 2016. "Ethical image, corporate social responsibility, and R&D valuation," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 335-348.
    7. Calá, Carla Daniela, 2009. "Spatial issues on firm demography: an analysis for Argentina," Nülan. Deposited Documents 1379, Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Sociales, Centro de Documentación.
    8. Shaanan, Joseph, 1997. "Idle sunk cost capacity, entry, and profitability: An empirical study," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 267-283.
    9. Boyer, Marcel & Lasserre, Pierre & Mariotti, Thomas & Moreaux, Michel, 2004. "Preemption and rent dissipation under price competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 309-328, March.
    10. Michael Waldman, 1983. "Limited Collusion and Entry Deterence," UCLA Economics Working Papers 306, UCLA Department of Economics.
    11. Louri, H. & Anagnostaki, V., 1995. "Entry and exit from Greek manufacturing industry: a test of the symmetry hypothesis," MPRA Paper 40575, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Robin Boadway & Jean-François Tremblay, 2003. "Public Economics and Startup Entrepreneurs," CESifo Working Paper Series 877, CESifo Group Munich.
    13. Sollner, Albrecht & Rese, Mario, 2001. "Market segmentation and the structure of competition: applicability of the strategic group concept for an improved market segmentation on industrial markets," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 25-36, January.
    14. Fershtman,C. & de Zeeuw,A., 1995. "Tradeable Emission Permits in Oligopoly," Papers 45-95, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
    15. Marcel Boyer & Pierre Lasserre & Thomas Mariotti & Michel Moreaux, 2001. "Preemption and Rent Dissipation under Bertrand Competition," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 20-04, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
    16. Miguel Flores, 2011. "24/7," Discussion Papers in Economics 11/51, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.
    17. Michael Waldman, 1987. "Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(2), pages 301-310.
    18. Fershtman, C. & de Zeeuw, A.J., 1991. "Capital accumulation and entry deterrence : A clarifying note," Discussion Paper 1991-41, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    19. Arping, Stefan & Diaw, Khaled M., 2008. "Sunk costs, entry deterrence, and financial constraints," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 490-501, March.
    20. Read, Colin, 1997. "Development Effort in Speculative Real Estate Competitions," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 1-15, March.
    21. Marcel Boyer & Pierre Lasserre & Thomas Mariotti & Michel Moreaux, 2000. "Preemption and Rent Dissipation with Multiple Investments," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-06, CIRANO.

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