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Methodologische Grundlagen einer Evaluation von Wettbewerbspolitik

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  • Hüschelrath, Kai

Abstract

Im Jahre 2005 fand im Rahmen eines OECD Policy Roundtables ein intensiver Meinungsaustausch der Mitgliedsstaaten zu dem Thema 'Evaluation of the Actions and Resources of the Competition Authorities' statt. Eine wesentliche Erkenntnis der Gespräche bestand in der Feststellung, dass [c]onsiderable work remains to be done to refine the methodologies used to evaluate the effectiveness of completed competition policy interventions (OECD, 2005,. S. 10). Obwohl seit der Formulierung dieser Arbeitsvorgabe erst einige Jahre vergangen sind, so hat die Bedeutung der Evaluation von Wettbewerbspolitik seitdem deutlich zugenommen - sowohl im wissenschaftlichen Bereich als auch im Bereich der Umsetzung in der Praxis. Die Schwerpunkte der Arbeiten lagen dabei allerdings nicht so sehr auf einer methodologischen Strukturierung und Aufbereitung der gesamten Problemstellung, sondern eher in der Verfeinerung bzw. Überprüfung bestimmter Methoden, der Betrachtung ausgewählter Fallstudien sowie der Umsetzung staatlicher Vorgaben der Qualitätskontrolle bzw. Rechenschaftspflichten. Vor diesem Hintergrund verfolgt dieser Beitrag nicht nur das Ziel einer Identifikation und Charakterisierung genereller methodologischer Bausteine einer Politikevaluation, sondern er beabsichtigt vor allem eine Einordnung der Erkenntnisse bestehender wettbewerbspolitischer Arbeiten in den geschaffenen methodologischen Rahmen vorzunehmen. Diese Vorgehensweise erlaubt nicht nur eine systematische Darstellung der methodologischen Überlegungen bestehender Studien, sondern ermöglicht gleichzeitig eine Identifikation von Problemen bei der Evaluation von Wettbewerbspolitik und somit die Ableitung von Forschungsbedarf.

Suggested Citation

  • Hüschelrath, Kai, 2009. "Methodologische Grundlagen einer Evaluation von Wettbewerbspolitik," ZEW Discussion Papers 09-084, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:09084
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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