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Modern Industrial Economics and Competition Policy: Open Problems and Possible Limits

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  • Oliver Budzinski

    () (Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern Denmark)

Abstract

Naturally, competition policy is based on competition economics made applicable in terms of law and its enforcement. Within the different branches of competition economics, modern industrial economics, or more precisely game-theoretic oligopoly theory, has become the dominating paradigm both in the U.S. (since the 1990s Post-Chicago movement) and in the EU (so-called more economic approach in the 2000s). This contribution reviews the state of the art in antitrust-oriented modern industrial economics and, in particular, critically discusses open questions and possible limits of basing antitrust on modern industrial economics. In doing so, it provides some hints how to escape current enforcement problems in industrial economics-based competition policy on both sides of the Atlantic. In particular, the paper advocates a change of the way modern industrial economics is used in competition policy: instead of more and more case-by-cases analyses, the insights from modern industrial economics should be used to design better competition rules. I like to thank the co-panelists Laurence Idot, Michele Polo and Daniel Rubin-feld as well as all the participants of the conference “Foundations and Limita-tions of an Economic Approach to Competition Law” (Max-Planck-Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law; Munich 12th / 13th March 2009), Arndt Christiansen and Nadine Lindstädt for very valuable and helpful comments.

Suggested Citation

  • Oliver Budzinski, 2009. "Modern Industrial Economics and Competition Policy: Open Problems and Possible Limits," Working Papers 93/09, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:sdk:wpaper:93
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Budzinski, Oliver & Haji Ali Beigi, Maryam, 2013. "Competition policy agendas for industrializing countries," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 81, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    2. Budzinski Oliver & Kuchinke Björn A., 2012. "Deal or No Deal? Consensual Arrangements as an Instrument of European Competition Policy," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 63(3), pages 265-292, December.
    3. Budzinski, Oliver, 2012. "Impact evaluation of merger control decisions," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 75, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    4. Oliver Budzinski, 2011. "Impact Evaluation of Merger Decisions," Working Papers 112/11, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.
    5. Budzinski, Oliver, 2012. "Würde eine unabhängige europäische Wettbewerbsbehörde eine bessere Wettbewerbspolitik machen?," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 78, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    6. Oliver Budzinski, 2010. "An Institutional Analysis of the Enforcement Problems in Merger Control," Working Papers 101/10, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.
    7. Budzinski, Oliver, 2012. "Empirische Ex-Post Evaluation von wettbewerbspolitischen Entscheidungen: Methodische Anmerkungen," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 69, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    competition policy; antitrust; modern industrial economics; more economic approach; merger control;

    JEL classification:

    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L00 - Industrial Organization - - General - - - General
    • M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics
    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary

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