IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

A Note on Competing Merger Simulation Models in Antitrust Cases: Can the Best Be Identified?

  • Oliver Budzinski

    ()

    (Philipps-University Marburg)

Advanced economic instruments like simulation models are enjoying an increased popularity in practical antitrust. There is hope that they – being quantitative predictive economic evidence – can substitute for qualitative structural analysis and lead to unambiguous results. This paper demonstrates that it can be theoretically impossible to identify the most appropriate simulation model for any given merger proposal. Due to the inevitable necessity to reduce real-world complexity and multi-parameter character of merger cases, the comparative fit of proposed merger simulation models with mutually incompatible predictions can be the same. This is valid even if an ideal antitrust procedure is assumed. This insight is important regarding two aspects. First, the scope for partisan economic evidence cannot be completely eroded in merger control. Second, simulation cannot eliminate or substitute for qualitative reasoning and economically informed common sense.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/03-2008_budzinski.pdf
File Function: First version, 2008
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) in its series MAGKS Papers on Economics with number 200803.

as
in new window

Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mar:magkse:200803
Contact details of provider: Postal: Universitätsstraße 25, 35037 Marburg
Phone: 06421/28-1722
Fax: 06421/28-4858
Web page: http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Epstein, Roy J. & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 2001. "Merger Simulation: A Simplified Approach with New Applications," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt9jt389nb, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  2. Oliver Budzinski, 2008. "Monoculture versus diversity in competition economics," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(2), pages 295-324, March.
  3. Gregory Werden, 2001. "Microsoft's Pricing of Windows and the Economics of Derived Demand Monopoly," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 257-262, May.
  4. Gilbert, Richard J & Katz, Michael, 2001. "An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt56f8p06q, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  5. David S. Evans & Albert L. Nichols & Richard Schmalensee, 2005. "U.S. v. Microsoft: Did Consumers Win?," NBER Working Papers 11727, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. C. Mantzavinos, 2006. "The institutional-evolutionary antitrust model," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 273-291, November.
  7. Philip Crooke & Luke Froeb & Steven Tschantz & Gregory Werden, 1999. "Effects of Assumed Demand Form on Simulated Postmerger Equilibria," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 205-217, November.
  8. Richard A. Posner, 1999. "The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert Witness," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(2), pages 91-99, Spring.
  9. Budzinski, Oliver & Christiansen, Arndt, 2007. "The Oracle/PeopleSoft case: unilateral effects, simulation models and econometrics in contemporary merger control," IBES Diskussionsbeiträge 157, University of Duisburg-Essen, Institute of Business and Economic Studie (IBES).
  10. Barry Nalebuff, 2002. "Bundling and the GE-Honeywell Merger," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm303, Yale School of Management.
  11. repec:reg:rpubli:109 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Epstein, Roy J. & Rubinfeld, Daniel, 2001. "Merger Simulation: A Simplified Approach with New Applications," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt1c65s24r, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  13. Epstein, Roy J. & Rubinfeld, Daniel, 2012. "Merger Simulation: A Simplified Approach with New Applications," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt2k9116ph, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  14. Baker, Jonathan B & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1999. "Empirical Methods in Antitrust Litigation: Review and Critique," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1-2), pages 386-435, Fall.
  15. Michael J. Mandel, 1999. "Going for the Gold: Economists as Expert Witnesses," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(2), pages 113-120, Spring.
  16. Lars-Hendrik Roeller & Oliver Stehmann, 2006. "The Year 2005 at DG Competition: The Trend towards a More Effects-Based Approach," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 281-304, December.
  17. Roy J. Epstein & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2002. "Merger Simulation: A Simplified Approach with New Applications," Industrial Organization 0201002, EconWPA.
  18. Damien J. Neven, 2006. "Competition economics and antitrust in Europe," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 21(48), pages 741-791, October.
  19. Ivaldi, Marc & Verboven, Frank, 2005. "Quantifying the effects from horizontal mergers in European competition policy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 669-691, December.
  20. Rubinfeld, Daniel L. & Epstein, Roy J., 2001. "Merger Simulation: A Simplified Approach with New Applications," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt2sq9s8c8, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  21. Gregory Werden, 2000. "Expert Report in United States v. Interstate Bakeries Corp. and Continental Baking Co," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(2), pages 139-148.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mar:magkse:200803. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bernd Hayo)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.