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Going for the Gold: Economists as Expert Witnesses

Author

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  • Michael J. Mandel

Abstract

The use of economists as expert witnesses and consultants has grown dramatically in recent years, driven by such factors as the explosion of mergers and acquisitions. On the plus side, the expert witness boom will likely lead to better regulatory and legal decisions, while infusing real-world examples into classroom teaching. Yet the growing importance of consulting income could divert time and energy away from academic research and teaching, while impeding intellectual debate. A new standard of behavior for academic economists who serve as expert witnesses and consultants may be needed, including full disclosure of clients.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael J. Mandel, 1999. "Going for the Gold: Economists as Expert Witnesses," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(2), pages 113-120, Spring.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:13:y:1999:i:2:p:113-120
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.13.2.113
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    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.13.2.113
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    Cited by:

    1. Oliver Budzinski, 2009. "Modern Industrial Economics and Competition Policy: Open Problems and Possible Limits," Working Papers 93/09, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.
    2. Winand Emons, 2005. "Perjury versus Truth Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(3), pages 392-392, September.
    3. Oliver Budzinski & Isabel Ruhmer, 2010. "Merger Simulation In Competition Policy: A Survey," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 277-319.
    4. repec:spr:sjecst:v:154:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1186_s41937-017-0019-2 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Heine Klaus & Mause Karsten, 2003. "Politikberatung als informationsökonomisches Problem," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 223(4), pages 479-490, August.
    6. Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2004. "Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 307-327, May.
    7. repec:oup:jcomle:v:4:y:2008:i:1:p:1-30. is not listed on IDEAS
    8. DAHM, Matthias & PORTEIRO, Nicolas, 2003. "The political economy of interest groups: pressure and information," CORE Discussion Papers 2003057, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    9. Bruno Frey, 2006. "How Influential is Economics?," De Economist, Springer, vol. 154(2), pages 295-311, June.
    10. Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2016. "Expert opinion in a tort litigation game," Working Papers 2016-13, CRESE.
    11. Bruno S. Frey, 2000. "Was Bewirkt die Volkswirtschaftslehre?," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 1(1), pages 5-33, February.
    12. Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2003. "Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(2), pages 259-259, June.
    13. Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, 2011. "Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(1), pages 1-24.
    14. Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2016. "Expert opinion in a tort litigation game," EconomiX Working Papers 2016-23, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    15. Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2016. "Expert opinion in a tort litigation game," Working Papers hal-01413908, HAL.
    16. Cooter, Robert D. & Emons, Winand, 2001. "Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts [technical version]," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt3587v9sv, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    17. Cléo Chassonnery-Zaïgouche, 2015. "Crossing Boundaries, Displacing Previous Knowledge and Claiming Superiority: Is the Economics of Discrimination a Conquest of Economics Imperialism?," STOREPapers 5_2015, Associazione Italiana per la Storia dell'Economia Politica - StorEP.
    18. Oliver Budzinski, 2008. "A Note on Competing Merger Simulation Models in Antitrust Cases: Can the Best Be Identified?," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200803, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • A11 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Role of Economics; Role of Economists
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General

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