Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts
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- Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2003. "Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(2), pages 259-279, June.
References listed on IDEAS
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"Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(2), pages 259-279, June.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Demougin, Dominique & Fluet, Claude, 2006.
"Preponderance of evidence,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 963-976, May.
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2002. "Preponderance of Evidence," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 150, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Denys Fluet, 2002. "Preponderance of Evidence," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-61, CIRANO.
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2002. "Preponderance of Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 725, CESifo.
- Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2004.
"Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts,"
European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 307-327, May.
- Cooter, Robert D. & Emons, Winand, 2000. "Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt35j9s08h, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- Friehe Tim, 2010. "On Avoidance Activities After Accidents," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 181-195, September.
- Cooter, Robert & Garoupa, Nuno, 2000. "The Virtuous Circle of Distrust: A Mechanism to Deter Bribes and Other Cooperative Crimes," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt83c0k3wc, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- Miller, James D., 2001. "Perjury and information weighting," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 329-341, September.
- Claude Fluet, 2009.
"Accuracy Versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(1), pages 134-156, May.
- Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2007. "Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures," CEPR Discussion Papers 6150, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2007. "Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The optimal Amount of Evidence under different Procedures," Diskussionsschriften dp0702, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2007. "Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: the Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures," Cahiers de recherche 0703, CIRPEE.
- Winand Emons, 2005.
"Perjury versus Truth Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(3), pages 392-410, September.
- Winand Emons, 2001. "Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony," Diskussionsschriften dp0103, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Ayouni, Mehdi & Friehe, Tim & Gabuthy, Yannick, 2023.
"Asking for information prior to settlement or trial when misrepresentation of evidence is possible,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 26-35.
- Mehdi Ayouni & Tim Friehe & Yannick Gabuthy, 2023. "Asking for information prior to settlement or trial when misrepresentation of evidence is possible," Post-Print hal-03987359, HAL.
- Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2005.
"The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony,"
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0520, CIRPEE.
- Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2005. "The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony," CEPR Discussion Papers 5124, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2005. "The Optimal Amount of Falsfied Testimony," Diskussionsschriften dp0506, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
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496, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Roland Hodler & Simon Loertscher & Dominic Rohner, 2010. "Biased Experts, Costly Lies, and Binary Decisions," Working Papers 10.01, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee.
- Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2003.
"Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(2), pages 259-279, June.
- Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2000. "Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0211, Econometric Society.
- Friehe, Tim, 2009. "Screening accident victims," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 272-280, September.
- Cooter Robert D. & Garoupa Nuno, 2014. "A Disruption Mechanism for Bribes," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(3), pages 241-263, November.
- Baum Ido & Feess Eberhard & Wohlschlegel Ansgar, 2009. "Reporter's Privilege and Incentives to Leak," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 701-715, November.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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