On Avoidance Activities After Accidents
This paper allows for avoidance activities in the accident setting and analyzes how this affects the evaluation of uncertain due care standards and of different negligence conceptions from an efficiency perspective. Importantly, our analysis also shows that punitive damages, i.e., damages above the harm incurred, can be welfare-reducing if injurers can choose avoidance.
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Volume (Year): 6 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Shmuel Leshem & Geoffrey P. Miller, 2009. "All-or-Nothing versus Proportionate Damages," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 345-382, 06.
- Innes, Robert, 2001. "Violator Avoidance Activities and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(1), pages 239-256, April.
- Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2003.
"Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE),
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(2), pages 259-259, June.
- Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2000. "Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0211, Econometric Society.
- Gary S. Becker, 1968.
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169-169.
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