Violator Avoidance Activities and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement
Laws often encourage violators to self-report their behavior. This article studies self-reporting enforcement regimes when violators can engage in "avoidance" activities--activities which lower an offender's risk of apprehension and punishment. Avoidance activities impart two advantages to self-reporting enforcement regimes over and above advantages identified in prior work. First, self-reporters do not engage in the costly avoidance activities that they would otherwise undertake. Second, by avoiding avoidance, self-reporting can sometimes permit the government to deter offenses with less enforcement effort. Copyright 2001 by Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 17 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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