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The Optimal Amount of Falsfied Testimony

  • Winand Emons
  • Claude Fluet

An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors or he can ask for further evidence from the two parties to the conflict. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. The arbiter is concerned about accuracy and low procedural costs. When both parties testify, each of them distorts the evidence less than when they testify alone. When the fixed cost of testifying is low, the arbiter hears both, for intermediate values one, and for high values no party at all. The ability to commit to an adjudication scheme makes it more likely that the arbiter requires evidence

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Paper provided by Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft in its series Diskussionsschriften with number dp0506.

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Date of creation: Jun 2005
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Handle: RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0506
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  8. Froeb, Luke M & Kobayashi, Bruce H, 1996. "Naive, Biased, Yet Bayesian: Can Juries Interpret Selectively Produced Evidence?," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 257-76, April.
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  10. Palumbo, Giuliana, 2001. "Trial procedures and optimal limits on proof-taking10," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 309-327, September.
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