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Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony

Author

Listed:
  • Winand Emons
  • Claude Fluet

Abstract

An arbiter has to decide a case under a purely adversarial procedure. He can do so using his priors, or the two parties to the conflict may present further evidence. The parties can distort the evidence in their favor at a cost. In equilibrium the two parties never testify together. When the evidence is much in favor of one party, this party testifies; the testimony is, however, distorted. When the evidence is close to the prior mean, no party testifies. We compare this result with the outcome under a purely inquisitorial procedure where the arbiter decides how much testimony he wants to hear. JEL Codes: D82, K41, K42.

Suggested Citation

  • Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2020. "Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 71(3), pages 429-457.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_713_0429
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    Cited by:

    1. Chulyoung Kim, 2017. "An economic rationale for dismissing low-quality experts in trial," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 64(5), pages 445-466, November.
    2. Kim, Chulyoung, 2016. "Adversarial bias, litigation, and the Daubert test: An economic approach," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 67-75.
    3. Kim, Chulyoung, 2015. "Centralized vs. Decentralized Institutions for Expert Testimony," MPRA Paper 69618, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Liu, Shuo & Migrow, Dimitri, 2022. "When does centralization undermine adaptation?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    5. Chulyoung Kim, 2014. "Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures with Information Acquisition," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(4), pages 767-803.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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