An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft
The Microsoft antitrust case focused public attention on the role of antitrust enforcement in preserving the forces of innovation in high-technology markets. Traditionally, regulators focused on whether companies artificially hiked prices or reduced output. Now, they're increasingly likely to look first at whether corporate behavior aids or impedes innovation. In this paper, we examine whether innovation has displaced short-term price effects as the focus of antitrust enforcement by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission and, to the extent that it has, whether enforcement actions are any different as a result. We also ask whether enforcement actions in the area of intellectual property and innovation have been consistent with the 1995 DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property [IP Guidelines]. Finally, we consider whether recent enforcement actions identify key areas in which additional guidance from the Agencies would be desirable. We address these questions first in merger cases and then in non-merger cases.
|Date of creation:||01 May 2001|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: F502 Haas, Berkeley CA 94720-1922|
Phone: (510) 642-1922
Fax: (510) 642-5018
Web page: http://www.escholarship.org/repec/iber_econ/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2002.
"The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(2), pages 194-220, Summer.
- Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 1998. "The Strategic Use Of Tying To Preserve And Create Market Power In Evolving Industries," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 145, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 1998. "The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries," NBER Working Papers 6831, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Salop, Steven C & Scheffman, David T, 1987. "Cost-Raising Strategies," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 19-34, September.
- Charles I. Jones & John C. Williams, 1998. "Measuring the Social Return to R&D," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 113(4), pages 1119-1135.
- Charles I. Jones & John C. Williams, "undated". "Measuring the Social Return to R&D," Working Papers 97002, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Charles I. Jones & John C. Williams, 1997. "Measuring the social return to R&D," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1997-12, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Richard Gilbert, 2000. "Exclusive Dealing, Preferential Dealing, and Dynamic Efficiency," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 16(2), pages 167-184, March.
- Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1987. "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 388-401, June.
- Whinston, Michael D, 1990. "Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 837-859, September.
- Michael D. Whinston, 1989. "Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion," NBER Working Papers 2995, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Zvi Griliches, 1998. "The Search for R&D Spillovers," NBER Chapters,in: R&D and Productivity: The Econometric Evidence, pages 251-268 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Griliches, Zvi, 1992. " The Search for R&D Spillovers," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 94(0), pages 29-47, Supplemen.
- Zvi Griliches, 1991. "The Search for R&D Spillovers," NBER Working Papers 3768, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Reinganum, Jennifer F., 1989. "The timing of innovation: Research, development, and diffusion," Handbook of Industrial Organization,in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 14, pages 849-908 Elsevier.
- Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, 1985. "On the Licensing of Innovations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 504-520, Winter. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt56f8p06q. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lisa Schiff)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.