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Strategic Incompatibility in ATM Markets

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Abstract

We test whether firms use incompatibility strategically, using data from ATM markets. High ATM fees degrade the value of competitors’ deposit accounts, and can in principle serve as a mechanism for siphoning depositors away from competitors or for creating deposit account differentiation. Our empirical framework can empirically distinguish surcharging motivated by this strategic concern from surcharging that simply maximizes ATM profit considered as a standalone operation. The results are consistent with such behavior by large banks, but not by small banks. For large banks, the effect of incompatibility seems to operate through higher deposit account fees rather than increased deposit account base.

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  • Christopher R. Knittel & Victor Stango, 2006. "Strategic Incompatibility in ATM Markets," Working Papers 06-08, NET Institute, revised Sep 2006.
    • Handle: RePEc:net:wpaper:0608
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    Cited by:

    1. Michal Grajek, 2003. "Estimating Network Effects and Compatibility in Mobile Telecommunications," CIG Working Papers SP II 2003-26, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
    2. Donze Jocelyn & Dubec Isabelle, 2011. "ATM Direct Charging Reform: the Effect of Independent Deployers on Welfare," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 1-23, June.
    3. Tobias Wenzel, 2014. "Independent Service Operators in ATM Markets," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 61(1), pages 26-47, February.
    4. Ioana Chioveanu & Ramon Fauli‐Oller & Joel Sandonis & Juana Santamaria, 2009. "Atm Surcharges: Effects On Deployment And Welfare," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 613-635, September.
    5. Christopher R. Knittel & Victor Stango, 2009. "How Does Incompatibility Affect Prices?: Evidence From Atm'S," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 557-582, September.
    6. Sobolewski, Maciej & Czajkowski, MikoŁaj, 2012. "Network effects and preference heterogeneity in the case of mobile telecommunications markets," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 197-211.
    7. Grajek, Michal, 2010. "Estimating network effects and compatibility: Evidence from the Polish mobile market," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 130-143, May.
    8. Miko?aj Czajkowski & Maciej Sobolewski, 2011. "Measuring network effects in mobile telecommunications markets with stated-preference valuation methods," International Journal of Management and Network Economics, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 2(2), pages 197-215.
    9. Robin S. Lee, 2013. "Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(7), pages 2960-3000, December.
    10. Robin S. Lee, 2014. "Competing Platforms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(3), pages 507-526, September.

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    JEL classification:

    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • E3 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
    • L6 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing

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