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Vertical antitrust policy as a problem of inference

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  • Cooper, James C.
  • Froeb, Luke M.
  • O'Brien, Dan
  • Vita, Michael G.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.

Volume (Year): 23 (2005)
Issue (Month): 7-8 (September)
Pages: 639-664

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Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:23:y:2005:i:7-8:p:639-664
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551

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  18. G.F. Mathewson & R.A. Winter, 1984. "An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 27-38, Spring.
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  22. Greg Shaffer, 1991. "Slotting Allowances and Resale Price Maintenance: A Comparison of Facilitating Practices," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(1), pages 120-135, Spring.
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  24. Reiffen, David, 1998. "Partial Ownership and Foreclosure: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 227-44, May.
  25. Lopatka, John E & Godek, Paul E, 1992. "Another Look at ALCOA: Raising Rivals' Costs Does Not Improve the View," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 311-29, October.
  26. Andrea Shepard, 1993. "Contractual Form, Retail Price, and Asset Characteristics in Gasoline Retailing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(1), pages 58-77, Spring.
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  28. Slade, Margaret E, 1998. "Strategic Motives for Vertical Separation: Evidence from Retail Gasoline Markets," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 84-113, April.
  29. Granitz, Elizabeth & Klein, Benjamin, 1996. "Monopolization by "Raising Rivals' Costs": The Standard Oil Case," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 1-47, April.
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  39. Barron, John M & Umbeck, John R, 1984. "The Effects of Different Contractual Arrangements: The Case of Retail Gasoline Markets," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 313-28, October.
  40. Daniel P. O'Brien & Greg Shaffer, 1997. "Nonlinear Supply Contracts, Exclusive Dealing, and Equilibrium Market Foreclosure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(4), pages 755-785, December.
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Cited by:

  1. Mitsuru Sunada, 2010. "Vertical Integration in the Japanese Movie Industry," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 135-150, June.
  2. Loertscher, Simon & Reisinger, Markus, 2009. "Competitive E?ects of Vertical Integration with Downstream Oligopsony and Oligopoly," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 278, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  3. Hans-Theo Normann, 2008. "Vertical Integration, Raising Rivals’ Costs and Upstream Collusion," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_30, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  4. James E. Prieger & Wei‐Min Hu, 2012. "Applications Barrier To Entry And Exclusive Vertical Contracts In Platform Markets," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(2), pages 435-452, 04.
  5. Bruce Owen, 2011. "Antitrust and Vertical Integration in “New Economy” Industries with Application to Broadband Access," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 38(4), pages 363-386, June.
  6. Suzuki, Ayako, 2009. "Market foreclosure and vertical merger: A case study of the vertical merger between Turner Broadcasting and Time Warner," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 532-543, July.
  7. Luke Froeb & James Cooper & Mark Frankena & Paul Pautler & Louis Silvia, 2005. "Economics at the FTC: Cases and Research, with a Focus on Petroleum," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 223-252, November.
  8. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, 2007. "Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(3), pages 629-685, September.
  9. Joshua Wright, 2011. "Does Antitrust Enforcement in High Tech Markets Benefit Consumers? Stock Price Evidence from FTC v. Intel," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 38(4), pages 387-404, June.
  10. Jürgen-Peter Kretschmer, 2014. "How to deal with resale price maintenance: What can we learn from empirical results?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 343-368, October.
  11. Roberto Hernán González & Praveen Kujal, 2012. "Vertical integration, market foreclosure and quality investment," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 1-20, April.
  12. Bastiaan Overvest, 2012. "A note on collusion and resale price maintenance," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 235-239, August.
  13. Christopher Yoo, 2014. "Merger Review by the Federal Communications Commission: Comcast–NBC Universal," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 295-321, November.
  14. Michael Baye & Matias Barenstein & Debra Holt & Pauline Ippolito & James Lacko & Jesse Leary & Janis Pappalardo & Paul Pautler & Michael Vita, 2008. "Economics at the FTC: The Google-DoubleClick Merger, Resale Price Maintenance, Mortgage Disclosures, and Credit Scoring in Auto Insurance," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 211-230, November.
  15. Joseph Farrell & Paul Pautler & Michael Vita, 2009. "Economics at the FTC: Retrospective Merger Analysis with a Focus on Hospitals," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 369-385, December.

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