Strategic and Welfare Implications of Bundling
A standard oligopoly model of bundling shows that bundling by a firm with a monopoly over one product has a strategic effect because it changes the substitution relationships between the goods among which consumers choose. Bundling in appropriate proportions is privately profitable, reduces rivals´ profits and overall welfare, and may drive rivals from the market.
|Date of creation:||Sep 1998|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in: Economics Letters. March 1999, 62(3) pp 371-76|
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- Schmalensee, Richard, 1984. "Gaussian Demand and Commodity Bundling," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(1), pages S211-30, January.
- William James Adams & Janet L. Yellen, 1976. "Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 90(3), pages 475-498.
- Spence, Michael, 1976. "Product Differentiation and Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 407-14, May.
- Slade, M. E., 1995. "The Leverage Theory of Tying Revisited," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 97b02, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- Margaret E. Slade, 1998. "The Leverage Theory of Tying Revisited: Evidence from Newspaper Advertising," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 65(2), pages 204-222, October.
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