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Winners, Losers, and Microsoft: Competition and Antitrust in High Technology Stan J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, 1999, pp. 288

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  • Erwin Blackstone
  • John Roccili
  • Joseph Fuhr

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  • Erwin Blackstone & John Roccili & Joseph Fuhr, 2002. "Winners, Losers, and Microsoft: Competition and Antitrust in High Technology Stan J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, 1999, pp. 288," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 30(4), pages 433-441, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:30:y:2002:i:4:p:433-441
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02298786
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Richard J. Gilbert & Michael L. Katz, 2001. "An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 25-44, Spring.
    2. Micha Gisser & Mark Allen, 2001. "One Monopoly Is Better Than Two: Antitrust Policy and Microsoft," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 19(2), pages 211-225, September.
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