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One Monopoly Is Better Than Two: Antitrust Policy and Microsoft

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  • Micha Gisser
  • Mark Allen

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  • Micha Gisser & Mark Allen, 2001. "One Monopoly Is Better Than Two: Antitrust Policy and Microsoft," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 19(2), pages 211-225, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:19:y:2001:i:2:p:211-225
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1011100703677
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Vernon, John M & Graham, Daniel A, 1971. "Profitability of Monopolization by Vertical Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(4), pages 924-925, July-Aug..
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    Cited by:

    1. Kopel, Michael & Löffler, Clemens & Pfeiffer, Thomas, 2017. "Complementary monopolies and multi-product firms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 28-30.
    2. Erwin Blackstone & John Roccili & Joseph Fuhr, 2002. "Winners, Losers, and Microsoft: Competition and Antitrust in High Technology Stan J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, 1999, pp. 288," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 30(4), pages 433-441, December.
    3. Bataille, Marc & Steinmetz, Alexander, 2013. "Intermodal competition on some routes in transportation networks: The case of inter urban buses and railways," DICE Discussion Papers 84, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    4. Wayne R. Dunham, 2006. "THE DETERMINATION OF ANTITRUST LIABILITY IN UNITED STATES v. MICROSOFT: THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE USED TO PROVE ITS CASE," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(4), pages 549-671.
    5. McHardy, Jolian & Reynolds, Michael & Trotter, Stephen, 2013. "Network interconnectivity with competition and regulation," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 97-110.
    6. Christian Genthon, 2007. "Can we measure Microsoft's market power ?," Post-Print halshs-00153837, HAL.

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    Keywords

    Cournot; Microsoft; monopoly; welfare;
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