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Noncooperative Game Theory: A Review with Potential Applications to Agricultural Markets

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  • Sexton, Richard J.

Abstract

This paper is a survey on noncooperative game theory relevant to agricultural markets. It is divided into two parts. Part I discussed types of noncooperative games and reviews important developments in noncooperative game theory solution concepts, including Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Strengths and weaknesses of game theory as a modelling tool are also assessed. Part II illustrates applications of the theory to agricultural markets. Game theory is relevant when markets are imperfectly competitive, and this paper argues that this condition is commonly met in agriculture. Specific topics of application include principal-agent models, vertical control, auctions, and bargaining. A shortened version of this paper was published in the Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics.

Suggested Citation

  • Sexton, Richard J., 1993. "Noncooperative Game Theory: A Review with Potential Applications to Agricultural Markets," Research Reports 25183, University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:uconnr:25183
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.25183
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    Cited by:

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    2. Prasertsri, Peerapon & Kilmer, Richard L., 2008. "The Bargaining Strength of a Milk Marketing Cooperative," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 37(2), pages 1-7.
    3. Jiaoju Ge & Alfonso Flores-Lagunes & Kilmer, 2015. "An analysis of bargaining power for milk cooperatives and milk processors in Florida," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(48), pages 5159-5168, October.

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