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An analysis of bargaining power for milk cooperatives and milk processors in Florida

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  • Jiaoju Ge
  • Alfonso Flores-Lagunes
  • Kilmer

Abstract

The Florida dairy market has a few fluid milk processors and many dairy farmers. The dairy farmers are represented in negotiation with the processors by a cooperative. This research builds a theoretical model of bargaining between the processors and a cooperative. The model is applied to the Florida dairy market to examine price negotiations between Florida milk processors and a dairy cooperative. An expectation maximization (EM) algorithm along with maximum likelihood estimation is used to estimate the econometric disequilibrium model with time series data for the period of October 1998 to May 2009. The results show that the class I price set by the Federal Milk Marketing Order is the major factor influencing the cooperative's supply reservation price. Negotiated quantity and production seasonality affect the processors' demand reservation price. The processors appear to be more patient and have higher average bargaining power (0.8804) than the cooperative (0.1196). The highest (lowest) bargaining power for the cooperative (processors) occurred in 2008 and the lowest (highest) bargaining power for the cooperative (processors) occurred in 2001.

Suggested Citation

  • Jiaoju Ge & Alfonso Flores-Lagunes & Kilmer, 2015. "An analysis of bargaining power for milk cooperatives and milk processors in Florida," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(48), pages 5159-5168, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:47:y:2015:i:48:p:5159-5168
    DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2015.1044645
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    Cited by:

    1. Hayashida, K., 2018. "Bargaining Power between Food Processors and Retailers: Evidence from Japanese Milk Transactions," 2018 Conference, July 28-August 2, 2018, Vancouver, British Columbia 277730, International Association of Agricultural Economists.

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