IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/eecrev/v37y1993i8p1569-1597.html

Customer coalitions, monopoly price discrimination and generic entry deterrence

Author

Listed:
  • Innes, Robert
  • Sexton, Richard J.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Innes, Robert & Sexton, Richard J., 1993. "Customer coalitions, monopoly price discrimination and generic entry deterrence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 1569-1597, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:37:y:1993:i:8:p:1569-1597
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0014-2921(93)90122-Q
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Doh-Shin Jeon & Domenico Menicucci, 2005. "Optimal Second-Degree Price Discrimination and Arbitrage: On the Role of Asymmetric Information Among Buyers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 337-360, Summer.
    2. Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, Bruno, 2001. "Competing cybermediaries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 797-808, May.
    3. Gans, Joshua S. & King, Stephen P., 2002. "Exclusionary contracts and competition for large buyers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(9), pages 1363-1381, November.
    4. Sexton, Richard J., 1994. "A Survey of Noncooperative Game Theory with Reference to Agricultural Markets: Part 2. Potential Applications in Agriculture," Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 62(02), pages 1-18, August.
    5. Jullien, Bruno, 2010. "Two-Sided B2B Platforms," IDEI Working Papers 652, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Mar 2011.
    6. Christian G. Asmussen & Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein, 2021. "Economizing and strategizing: How coalitions and transaction costs shape value creation and appropriation," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 413-434, February.
    7. Attila Ambrus & Rossella Argenziano, 2004. "Network Markets and Consumers Coordination," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1481, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    8. Sexton, Richard J., "undated". "The Role of Cooperatives in Increasingly Concentrated Agricultural Markets," Cooperatives: Their Importance in the Future Food and Agricultural System - FAMC 1990 Conference 265909, Food and Agricultural Marketing Consortium (FAMC).
    9. Liliane Karlinger & Massimo Motta, 2007. "Exclusionary Pricing and Rebates When Scale Matters," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/30, European University Institute.
    10. Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2019. "On the unprofitability of buyer groups when sellers compete," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 265-288.
    11. Xia, Tian & Sexton, Richard J., 2002. "Can Food Processors Use Contracts To Influence Farm Cash Prices? The Competitive Implications Of Top-Of-The-Market And Related Pricing Clauses," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA 19776, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    12. Jullien, Bruno, 2008. "Price Skewness and Competition in Multi-Sided Markets," IDEI Working Papers 504, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    13. Sexton, Richard J., 1993. "Noncooperative Game Theory: A Review with Potential Applications to Agricultural Markets," Research Reports 25183, University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center.
    14. Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, Bruno, 2001. "Chicken and Egg: Competing Matchmakers," CEPR Discussion Papers 2885, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Hueth, Brent & Moschini, GianCarlo, 2014. "Endogenous market structure and the cooperative firm," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(2), pages 283-285.
    16. Christodoulos Stefanadis, 2003. "Sunk Costs, Contestability, and the Latent Contract Market," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 119-138, March.
    17. Attila Ambrus & Rosella Argenziano, 2004. "Network Markets and Consumer Coordination," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 0423, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    18. Csorba, Gergely, 2008. "Contracting with asymmetric information in the presence of positive network effects: Screening and divide-and-conquer techniques," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 54-66, March.
    19. Bruno Jullien, 2011. "Competition in Multi-sided Markets: Divide and Conquer," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 186-220, November.
    20. Brian McManus, 2001. "Two‐Part Pricing with Costly Arbitrage," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 68(2), pages 369-386, October.
    21. Inderst, Roman & Wey, Christian, 2007. "Buyer power and supplier incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 647-667, April.
    22. Jacques Crémer & Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 2000. "Connectivity in the Commercial Internet," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(4), pages 433-472, December.
    23. Jullien, Bruno, 2001. "Competing with Network Externalities and Price Discrimination," CEPR Discussion Papers 2883, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    24. Jullien, Bruno, 2004. "Two-Sided Markets and Electronic Intermediation," IDEI Working Papers 295, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    25. Bruno Jullien, 2005. "Two-sided Markets and Electronic Intermediaries," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 51(2-3), pages 233-260.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:37:y:1993:i:8:p:1569-1597. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.