Innovation, Rent Extraction, and Integration in Systems Markets
We consider innovation incentives in markets where final goods comprise two strictly complementary components, one of which is monopolized. We focus on the case in which the complementary component is competitively supplied, and in which innovation is important. We explore ways in which the monopoly may have incentives to confiscate efficiency rents in the competitive sector, thus weakening or destroying incentives for independent innovation. We discuss how these problems are affected if the monopolist integrates into the competitive sector.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Whinston, Michael D, 1990.
"Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 837-59, September.
- Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 1998.
"The Strategic Use Of Tying To Preserve And Create Market Power In Evolving Industries,"
University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State
145, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2002. "The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(2), pages 194-220, Summer.
- Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 1998. "The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries," NBER Working Papers 6831, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Economides, Nicholas & Salop, Steven C, 1992. "Competition and Integration among Complements, and Network Market Structure," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(1), pages 105-23, March.
- repec:tpr:qjecon:v:111:y:1996:i:4:p:1153-81 is not listed on IDEAS
- Katz, Michael L., 1989. "Vertical contractual relations," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 655-721 Elsevier.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpdc:0303005. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.