IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v97y2007i5p1703-1730.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Antitrust in Innovative Industries

Author

Listed:
  • Ilya Segal
  • Michael D. Whinston

Abstract

We study the effects of antitrust policy in industries with continual innovation. Antitrust policies that restrict incumbent behavior toward new entrants may have conflicting effects on innovation incentives, raising the profits of new entrants, but lowering those of continuing incumbents. We show that the direction of the net effect can be determined by analyzing shifts in innovation benefit and supply, holding the innovation rate fixed. We apply this framework to analyze several specific antitrust policies. We also show that, in some cases, the tension does not arise, and policies that protect entrants necessarily raise the rate of innovation. (JEL K21, L13, L14, L40, O30)

Suggested Citation

  • Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, 2007. "Antitrust in Innovative Industries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1703-1730, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:97:y:2007:i:5:p:1703-1730
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.5.1703
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.97.5.1703
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/dec07/20050026_app.pdf
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Richard J. Gilbert & Michael L. Katz, 2001. "An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 25-44, Spring.
    2. Aghion, Philippe & Howitt, Peter, 1992. "A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(2), pages 323-351, March.
    3. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1990. "A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 93-106, March.
    4. Hugo Hopenhayn & Gerard Llobet & Matthew Mitchell, 2006. "Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents, and Buyouts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(6), pages 1041-1068, December.
    5. Milgrom, Paul & Shannon, Chris, 1994. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(1), pages 157-180, January.
    6. David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, 2002. "Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis in Dynamically Competitive Industries," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 2, pages 1-50, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Adam B. Jaffe & Josh Lerner & Scott Stern, 2002. "Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 2," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number jaff02-1, March.
    8. Robert M. Hunt, 2004. "Patentability, Industry Structure, and Innovation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(3), pages 401-425, September.
    9. Jeremy C. Stein, 1997. "Waves of Creative Destruction: Firm-Specific Learning-by-Doing and the Dynamics of Innovation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 64(2), pages 265-288.
    10. Ilya Segal, 1999. "Contracting with Externalities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(2), pages 337-388.
    11. Tom Lee & Louis L. Wilde, 1980. "Market Structure and Innovation: A Reformulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 94(2), pages 429-436.
    12. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1994. "Comparing Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 441-459, June.
    13. repec:aei:rpbook:53444 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Glenn C. Loury, 1979. "Market Structure and Innovation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 93(3), pages 395-410.
    15. Michael D. Whinston, 2001. "Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don't Know," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 63-80, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Gerard Llobet & Javier Suarez, 2010. "Entrepreneurial Innovation, Patent Protection and Industry Dynamics," Working Papers wp2010_1001, CEMFI.
    2. Rockett, Katharine, 2010. "Property Rights and Invention," Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, in: Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 315-380, Elsevier.
    3. Keith N. Hylton & Haizhen Lin, 2008. "Innovation and Optimal Punishment, with Antitrust Applications," Working Papers 2008-09, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    4. Steffen Juranek & Thomas Quan & John L. Turner, 2020. "Patents, Litigation Strategy and Antitrust in Innovative Industries," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 56(4), pages 667-696, June.
    5. Marshall, Guillermo & Parra, Álvaro, 2019. "Innovation and competition: The role of the product market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 221-247.
    6. Da Rin, Marco & Hellmann, Thomas, 2002. "Banks as Catalysts for Industrialization," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 366-397, October.
    7. Nelson, Kelly P. & Parton, Lee C. & Brown, Zachary S., 2022. "Biofuels policy and innovation impacts: Evidence from biofuels and agricultural patent indicators," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    8. Jeroen Hinloopen & Grega Smrkolj & Florian Wagener, 2016. "R&D Cooperatives and Market Collusion: A Global Dynamic Approach," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 16-048/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    9. Popov, E. V. & Vlasov, M. V. & Shishkina, A. Yu. & Yakimova, A. V., 2016. "Institutional Analysis of Resource Potential for Knowledge Generation in the Enterprises of the Regional Defense-Industrial Sector," R-Economy, Ural Federal University, Graduate School of Economics and Management, vol. 2(3), pages 314-323.
    10. Javier Suarez & Gerard Llobet, 2008. "Financially Constrained Innovation, Patent Protection, and Industry Dynamics," 2008 Meeting Papers 102, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    11. Leibowicz, Benjamin D., 2018. "Welfare improvement windows for innovation policy," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 390-398.
    12. Yevgeniy Popov & Maksim Vlasov & Anna Shishkina & Anastasia Yakimova, 2016. "Institutional Analysis of Knowledge Generation Resource Potential at the Enterprises of Regional Military-Industrial Complex," Economy of region, Centre for Economic Security, Institute of Economics of Ural Branch of Russian Academy of Sciences, vol. 1(3), pages 839-851.
    13. Freilich, Janet & Shahshahani, Sepehr, 2023. "Measuring follow-on innovation," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(9).
    14. Sudipto Bhattacharya & Claude d’Aspremont & Sergei Guriev & Debapriya Sen & Yair Tauman, 2014. "Cooperation in R&D: Patenting, Licensing, and Contracting," International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, in: Kalyan Chatterjee & William Samuelson (ed.), Game Theory and Business Applications, edition 2, chapter 0, pages 265-286, Springer.
    15. Simon P. Anderson, Nisvan Erkal and, 2009. "Aggregative Oligopoly Games with Entry," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1175, The University of Melbourne, revised 2013.
    16. Xiangkang Yin & Ehud Zuscovitch, 1999. "Interaction of Drastic and Incremental Innovations: Economic Development Through Schumpeterian Waves," Working Papers 1999.02, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
    17. Etro, Federico, 2019. "Monopolistic competition for the market with heterogeneous firms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 9-12.
    18. James Bessen & Eric Maskin, 2009. "Sequential innovation, patents, and imitation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(4), pages 611-635, December.
    19. Christos Koulovatianos & Leonard J. Mirman, 2003. "R&D Investment, Market Structure, and Industry Growth," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 8-2003, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    20. Shastitko. Andrey (Шаститко, Андрей) & Komkova, Anastasia Andreevna (Комкова, Анастасия Андреевна) & Kurdin, Alexander (Курдин, Александр) & Shastitko, Anastasia (Шаститко, Анастасия), 2016. "Competition Policy and Incentives for Innovation [Конкурентная Политика И Стимулы К Инновационной Деятельности]," Working Papers 1447, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • O30 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:97:y:2007:i:5:p:1703-1730. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.