Horizontal mergers in the iron ore industry--An application of PCAIDS
The purpose of this paper is to estimate and analyse the price effects of the iron ore mergers between Rio Tinto and North Ltd in 2000, and CVRD and Caemi in 2001. The analyses are conducted using a merger simulation model that, based on the pre-merger situation, estimates the post-merger outcome. This paper applies the so-called proportionality-calibrated almost ideal demand system (PCAIDS) model, which assumes that the product is differentiated and that the strategic variable is price. The results from the merger simulations show that in the case of the merger between Rio Tinto and North Ltd, the merged firm has a combined market share of almost 20%. However, the estimated market weighted average price effect is only 2.6%. Regarding the merger between CVRD and Caemi, the merged firm's market share is about 29%, and the estimated market weighted average price effect is 4.6%. When removing Caemi's Canadian asset, which was the Commission decision in order to allow the merger, the market price effect decreases to 3.1%. Overall the results in this study support the Commission's decisions regarding both merger cases, and shows that merger simulations of price effects can be valuable tools in merger assessments.
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